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Mixed Messages: The Supreme Court’s Conﬂicting Decisions
on Juries in Death Penalty Cases
By Kenneth Miller and david niven1

W

ere the jury made up of experienced
death penalty lawyers, it might understand these instructions . . . in the way
that the Court understands them. - Jutice

Breyer1

The right to a jury of one’s peers is fundamental
for those accused of criminal wrongdoing. For those
charged with a capital crime, a jury may be all that
stands between the defendant and a sentence of death.
However, a jury pool that systematically excludes members of certain races or individuals with reservations
concerning the death
penalty cannot be said to
satisfy the Sixth Amendment. Likewise, a jury that
cannot understand the law
it must follow, as set forth
in legal instructions, cannot
fulfill this vital function of
democracy, nor does such a
jury provide a defendant a
meaningful Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Yet it is almost a truism that
jurors do not understand
their legal instructions and
that juries are hardly representative bodies.
Jury instructions, by and large, are written by
committees of lawyers, or are quoted verbatim from
statutory or case law. The result is jargon-ridden language that lawyers might understand, but laypersons
certainly would not understand. It is no surprise that social scientists have demonstrated repeatedly that, in a
myriad of settings using diverse methods, jurors do not
understand the instructions that are intended to guide
them. Researchers are not alone here; jurors themselves
register their confusion by requesting clarification from
trial judges. The criminal justice system, however, has
been slow to respond, and appellate courts continue to
“presume” that jurors understand their instructions, even
when jurors ask pointed questions regarding the meanCriminal Law Brief

ing of those same instructions. Moreover, capital proceedings continue, with the passive or direct support of
the Court, to assemble jury panels dramatically skewed
relative to the community as a whole. The Supreme
Court, in a series of decisions beginning with Apprendi
v. New Jersey,2 has expanded the role of juries in the
criminal sentencing process, granting juries many powers previously relegated to judges. Following Ring v.
Arizona,3 capital juries must be given the task of determining whether the prosecution has established the relevant aggravating circumstances that would make the
defendant eligible for the
death penalty. The Court
has also decided to expand
the role of juries under the
federal criminal sentencing
guidelines. We argue that
the expansion of Sixth
Amendment rights is necessarily bad, but we are
concerned with and will
explore the implications of
expanding the role of juries
in capital, as well as other
criminal cases, when juries
are not given sufficient
tools with which to work.
Specifically, juries cannot
hope to fulfill their duties when they do not understand
their instructions, when no effort is made to clarify those
instructions, and when juries under-represent certain
segments of the population.
In short, the Supreme Court has expanded a defendant’s right to a jury in capital cases without commensurate attention to the obligations on government
that would make that right meaningful. The legal and
social science literature is replete with commentary and
research on the alarming lack of understanding that jurors demonstrate in capital and other criminal cases.4
The fact that death qualification and voir dire exclude
certain members of society has been demonstrated repeatedly. Likewise, the literature is fairly consistent in
praising the expansion of a criminal defendant’s Sixth
69

Amendment rights. What we show, however, is that
when these two trends are laid side by side, there is a
troubling – even glaring – lack of congruity between the
expansion of the Sixth Amendment and any effort to
make that right meaningful.
More to the point, Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas, seem particularly willing to expand Sixth
Amendment rights without thought to corresponding
governmental obligations to animate that right. The collective jurisprudence of Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas
in one area is completely uninformed by their jurisprudence in another area. This leads to quite troubling implications regarding the justice of capital and other
criminal trials.
The expAnding sixTh AmendmenT
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a
trial by jury for the criminally accused. But what is the
nature of that right? It is not enough to say that the jury
determines the defendant’s guilt or innocence, for the
Sixth Amendment means much more – and less – than
the mere determination of guilt. Indeed, the nature and
extent of a criminal defendant’s right to a jury has
changed considerably over time. It was not until 1970,
when the United States Supreme Court decided In re
Winship, that the familiar “reasonable doubt” standard
became a constitutionally required element of criminal
due process.5 After reflecting on a long tradition of
using the reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials in
the United States, the Court found it necessary to state:
“[l]est there remain any doubt about the constitutional
stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly
hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.”6 After Winship, then, a criminal defendant appeared to have a constitutional right to
a jury determination of his or her guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.”7
However, the Court complicated matters in an
opinion written by Rehnquist, 8 when it failed to overturn a state statute that increased the sentence of a person convicted of a felony by five years based on a
judicial finding – by a preponderance of the evidence –
that the person “visibly possessed” a firearm.9 The
Court reasoned that the “visible possession” of a firearm
portion of the statute was not an element of the crime;
rather, it was a “sentencing consideration” and did not
70

subject the defendant to a greater penalty than he would
have been subject to otherwise under the statute.10 Rehnquist stated that because they “concluded that Pennsylvania may properly treat visible possession as a
sentencing consideration and not an element of any offense, we need only note that there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence
turns on specific findings of fact.”11 In other words, the
criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right was limited to jury determinations of elements of the crime, not
sentencing considerations, and the distinction between
elements of the crime and sentencing considerations was
a matter of statutory construction. The only limit
McMillan placed on a sentencing consideration was that
it not impose a sentence beyond the maximum allowed
by the underlying charge.
The McMillan decision left open the question of
whether, upon conviction for first degree murder, a person was entitled to a jury determination of any facts that
could expose him or her to a death sentence. In Walton
v. Arizona (1990),12 the Court considered Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme, which called for a judge to determine the existence of aggravating factors during the
sentencing phase of a first-degree murder trial. If the
judge found at least one aggravating factor, the defendant was eligible for the death penalty and would avoid
that sentence only if the judge found sufficient mitigating circumstances that called for leniency. The Court
upheld this capital sentencing scheme, stating that the
factors that led to a death sentence were not elements,
but sentencing considerations that did not entitle a defendant to a jury consideration. Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the sentencing scheme did not violate the
Sixth Amendment.13
Thus, after Walton, it was clear that a defendant’s sentence could be increased up to and including
death if that sentence was one that fell within the
charged crime’s sentencing range even if a judge rather
than a jury found the facts necessary to increase the sentence, and even if the judge found the necessary facts
by a standard of proof less rigorous than beyond a reasonable doubt. What was left unanswered by Walton,
however, was whether a defendant’s sentence could be
increased beyond McMillan’s ‘statutory maximum.’
The Court addressed just such a question in Jones v.
United States (1999),14 when the defendant was convicted of a federal carjacking, a statute that carried with
it a maximum sentence of fifteen years. The defendant
was eventually sentenced to twenty-five years after a judicial finding that serious bodily injury had occurred
Winter 2009

during the course of the crime.15 On appeal, the Court
concluded that the finding of “serious bodily injury” was
an element of the crime rather than a mere sentencing
consideration because, after an analysis of similar federal criminal statutes, “Congress probably intended serious bodily injury to be an element defining an
aggravated form of the crime.”16 Accordingly, Jones
stood for the proposition that if a defendant’s sentence
increased because of statutorily constructed elements (as
opposed to sentencing considerations) the defendant
was entitled to a jury determination beyond a reasonable
doubt on the facts necessary to support those elements.17
Although Jones could be seen as a decision favorable to defendants, the extent of the Sixth Amendment right after Jones was somewhat truncated. A
defendant was clearly entitled to a jury determination
beyond a reasonable doubt on every element that constituted the crime. The Court had carved away that
right, however, so that an “element” of the crime did not
include – nor was a defendant entitled to a jury determination thereof – every factor that increased his or her
sentence.
In a groundbreaking case, the Court in Apprendi
v. New Jersey,18 opened the door to a broader Sixth
Amendment right than McMillan suggested. In Apprendi, the defendant was charged under state law with
criminal possession of a firearm, which carried with it a
prison sentence of up to ten years. After pleading guilty,
the trial court determined by a preponderance of the evidence, that Apprendi violated the state’s hate crime
statute. Apprendi was sentenced to twelve years based
on this finding – a sentence two years in excess of the
statutory maximum. On appeal, the state defended Apprendi’s sentence, arguing that the state hate crime
statute was merely a permissible “sentence enhancement” similar to the enhancement upheld in McMillan.
The Court disagreed, noting that “[a]s a matter of simple
justice, it seems obvious that the procedural safeguards
designed to protect Apprendi from unwarranted pains
should apply equally to the two acts that New Jersey has
singled out for punishment. Merely using the label ‘sentence enhancement’ to describe the latter surely does not
provide a principled basis for treating them differently.”19 The Court noted that Apprendi was “indisputably” entitled to “a jury determination that he is
guilty of every element of the crime with which he is
charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.”20 And then, as if
to reiterate the point, the Court stated that “[e]qually
well founded is the companion right to have the jury verdict based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”21 The
Criminal Law Brief

Court went on to trace the history of criminal jury trials
and admitted that it “coined” the term “sentencing factor” in its McMillan decision, creating a species of criminal law facts that were not determined by a jury but
could nevertheless “affect the sentence imposed by the
judge.”22 The Court concluded that based on its own decisions and the history of criminal law in the United
States “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”23 “It is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury
the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range
of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.
It is equally clear that such facts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.”24
The Court seemed untroubled that its ruling
could be considered overruling Walton, in which the defendant’s sentence was set at life in prison and, but for
the trial court’s factual findings, could not be increased
to a sentence of death. The Court rejected this concern,
stating that “once a jury has found the defendant guilty
of all the elements of an offense for which carries as its
maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left
to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty,
rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed.”25 The
Court, with Apprendi, expanded the right to a jury trial
but carved out an exception for capital cases in which
judges could determine the facts necessary to impose a
sentence of death.
It only took two years for the Court to overturn
that exception, however. In Ring v. Arizona (2002),26
the Court again considered the Arizona capital sentencing scheme it had previously upheld in Walton: “Capital
defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, we conclude, are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on
which the legislature conditions an increase in their
maximum punishment.”27 Contrasting its holding in Apprendi, the Court stated that “[t]he right to trial by jury
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence by two years,
but not the fact-finding necessary to put him to death.”28
The Court held that “to the extent [a capital sentencing
scheme] allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a
jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for
imposition of the death penalty,” that scheme is unconstitutional.29
For our purposes here, Ring marks the state-ofthe-art Sixth Amendment jurisprudence concerning cap71

ital defendants. However, two recent decisions show must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable
how the Court is continuing to expand the right to a jury doubt, and
- Capital defendants, no less than other criminal
in non-capital cases. In Blakeley v. Washington,30 the
Court considered the meaning of “statutory maximum” defendants, are entilted to all the protections of the Sixth
as it applies to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. At Amendment. This expansion in the meaning of the Sixth
issue was a state law that allowed a sentencing judge to Amendment is encouraging for proponents of robust defendant rights. It removes factual dedepart from the standard senterminations that can determine the
tencing range if the judge found
For
the
capital
defenfate of the criminal defendant from
the defendant acted with “deliberate cruelty.”31 The Court held
dant to have a mean- the hands of the government (in these
cases judges). But for any right to be
that “the “statutory maximum
ingful right to a jury meaningful, it must be accompanied
for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may
trial, it is incumbent by corresponding obligations that are
fulfilled by appropriate actors. For
impose solely on the basis of
facts reflected in the jury verdict upon the legal system the capital defendant to have a meanor admitted by the defendant . .
to ensure that, among ingful right to a jury trial, it is incumbent upon the legal system to ensure
. . In other words, the relevant
other
things:
the
jury
is
that, among other things: the jury is
‘statutory maximum’ is not the
maximum sentence a judge may
adequately informed adequately informed of the appropriate law; there are adequate safeguards
impose after finding additional
of
the
appropriate
law;
in place to ensure that a misinformed
facts, but the maximum he may
jury is properly corrected; and the seimpose without any additional
there
are
adequate
32
lected jury is free from bias or prejufinding.” The Court’s opinion
safeguards
in
place
to
dice.
was not remarkable because it
broke with the Apprendi ruling,
ensure that a misinJuRoR misundeRsTAnding
but rather because it called into
question the federal sentencing formed jury is properly
guidelines, which look a lot like
It would seem that in matters as
corrected; and the sethe state sentencing scheme
weighty as capital jury deliberations,
overturned by the Court. As if lected jury is free from the Court would vigorously strive to
on cue, the Court examined the
ensure that jurors understand their inbias or prejudice.
federal sentencing guidelines in
structions – instructions that are comUnited States v. Booker
plex and replete with legalese.
33
(2005). In Booker, the Court fell short of invalidating Knowing what we know about jurors (especially capital
the federal sentencing guidelines but did confirm that jurors) and the instructions they are required to follow,
the guidelines were also subject to the requirements of the criminal justice system should demonstrate both an
the Sixth Amendment as stated in Apprendi.34 The awareness that jurors frequently will not understand
Blakely and Booker decisions merely confirm that the those instructions 35 and a willingness to redress misunCourt is intent on expanding the right to a jury trial.
derstandings as they arise.
This brief overview of the Court’s recent Sixth
Instead, the law in this area is based on a preAmendment jurisprudence demonstrates that the right sumption that jurors understand and follow their instructo a jury trial has expanded considerably since In re Win- tions.36 As the Court emphatically stated, “we adhere to
ship. As it stands now, the right to a jury trial means, at the crucial assumption underlying our constitutional sysleast, that:
tem of trial by jury that jurors carefully follow instruc- The defendant is entilted to a jury determina- tions.”37 Of course, a weak presumption (or
tion of each and every element of the crime;
assumption38) that jurors understand their instructions
- The jury must be convinced beyond a reason- would serve this purpose well. Capital trials would opable doubt about each and every element;
erate effectively if it were assumed that jurors under- Despite a flirtation with “sentencing consider- stand and follow their instructions absent evidence to
ations,” any fact that increases a defendant’s sentence the contrary. But, it does not work that way. Rather,
72
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the presumption that jurors understand their instructions
is used to buttress against attacks on death sentences and
other criminal convictions. The blind allegiance to the
presumption that jurors understand their instructions is
so overwhelming that it has nearly morphed into a standard whereby appellate courts look the other way despite overwhelming evidence that jurors fail to
comprehend their instructions.
As a threshold matter, it would seem that if a defendant raises the possibility that the jury instructions
are subject to competing interpretations, one of which
would result in unconstitutional considerations, a reviewing court should first look at the instruction itself
for the claimed ambiguity. If the instruction is subject
to at least one unconstitutional interpretation, it is probably not possible to determine whether the jury applied
the correct interpretation – after all, appellate judges
cannot step inside the minds of jurors. Instead, following a developing line of argument first introduced in dissent then later marshaled for the majority, Rehnquist has
successfully advanced the notion that the possibility of
unconstitutional interpretation need not impinge on the
Court’s confidence in producing a just verdict.
Thus, even when the jury questions a judge on
an ambiguous instruction and receives an ambiguous response, that jury is, in the words of Rehnquist, “presumed both to follow its instructions and to understand
a judge’s answer to its question.”39 As Scalia admits, the
presumption is closer to an article of faith than a demonstrable truth: “The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in
the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than
in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process.”40
But does available evidence support the position
that jurors understand and follow their instructions? It
does not. The list of studies demonstrating the inability
of typical citizens to process, much less faithfully act
upon, jury instructions is capacious.41 Social science evidence suggests that misunderstood instructions do not
merely confuse juries, they tend to tilt the process in the
prosecution’s favor.
While any legal process built upon a foundation
of misunderstanding is intolerable, both legally and logically, the weakness of juror instructions is also a logistical impediment to the functioning of our courts. For
example, a comprehensive study of the legal fates of
capital defendants found that fully 20% of death sentence reversals are based on unconstitutional jury inCriminal Law Brief

structions.42
Two areas of capital sentencing instructions that
have proved particularly fertile for producing challenges
based on potential juror misunderstanding are mitigation
instructions and definition of sentence instructions.
Mitigation
When a divided Court permitted the re-implementation of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia
(1976),43 only four years after a similarly divided Court
had effectively suspended the death penalty in Furman
v. Georgia,44 justices sought to establish boundaries for
its use. The death penalty, the Court ruled, may only
be imposed if it is “directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”45
In Gregg, and a series of subsequent cases, the
Court established the value of a bifurcated trial process.
Typically, a single jury in a capital case would, in effect,
sit through two trials, deliberate twice, and reach two
verdicts. In the first, as in any non-capital trial, the jury
would hear evidence and render a verdict on guilt. If
the defendant were found guilty of a capital crime, the
jury then would hear evidence relating to the nature of
the crime and the nature of the defendant and render a
verdict on the appropriate sentence.
In the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution seeks to establish aggravating evidence – typically
relating to the heinousness of the crime and the depravity of the defendant. The defense is entitled to rebut
those claims, and is also entitled to introduce evidence
relating to any aspect of the defendant’s character or
background that might mitigate the defendant’s actions
and suggest a sentence short of death.46 The Court has
ruled that mitigating evidence is not subject to a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, and can result in a
verdict rejecting the death sentence based on juror
agreement that mitigation exists, even if jurors do not
unanimously agree on specific mitigating factors.47
Despite the gravity of a death sentence deliberation, and the centrality of weighing aggravating and
mitigating evidence to that process, numerous academic
studies suggest that jurors are ill-equipped or disinclined
to adequately consider mitigating evidence.48 In short,
many jurors do not understand the instructions they are
given by the courts that are supposed to guide their deliberations and verdict. The consequences of misunderstanding are considerable. “If the jury does not
understand how the law requires it to establish, weigh,
and balance aggravation and mitigation,” Wiener and
colleagues argue, “then it may well be requiring the de73

fendant to forfeit his or her life without the benefit of
due process of law.”49
To test juror understanding of the death sentencing and deliberation process, one study used members
of the jury pool in Columbus, Ohio who were awaiting
assignment to a case.50 The researchers showed those
jurors a video summarizing a capital case, followed by
the actual instructions read by a judge.51 After a period
of deliberation, jurors were given a multiple-choice test
to measure their understanding of their duties.52 The
questions most frequently answered incorrectly involved the concept of mitigation.53 The questions most
frequently answered correctly involved the concept of
aggravation.54
Another study used a similar method with jury
eligible citizens in the St. Louis area.55 After supplying
the typical instructions offered by Missouri courts in
capital cases, they found only a 50% rate of understanding for mitigation concepts.56
When a 1994 study provided California juror instructions to a college student sample, they also found
fewer than half could explain mitigation.57 More alarmingly, one-fourth of the subjects thought a mitigating
factor (such as mental illness) was a basis for supporting
a death sentence.58
While these studies employ a variety of proxy
groups to substitute for actual deliberating capital juries,
there is little doubt that the patterns unearthed apply in
the jury room. Indeed, surveys of former capital jurors
confirm confusion regarding mitigating factors and a
willingness to see mitigating evidence as irrelevant.59
One capital juror summed up the mitigating evidence
presented in the sentencing proceeding: “It was interesting, but it had no bearing on the case…his whole life
boils down to this once incident.60
Beyond discounting mitigating evidence, research suggests the application and weighing of mitigating factors can be dependent on personal biases. One
survey of former capital jurors found that contrary to the
laws and their sworn duty, jurors were less apt to value
mitigating evidence if they felt empathy for the victim.61
Empathy, in turn, was affected by factors including the
race of the victim.
One could summarize the situation by noting
that “existing literature converges on a serious challenge
to the assumption that reasonable individuals understand
jury instructions,” and therefore, “courts should be cautious in concluding that reasonable people understand
mitigation and aggravation as presented in pattern instructions.”62 In fact, contrary to all applicable laws, the
74

typical juror enters the sentencing proceeding with a
“presumption of death.”63 Instead of alleviating that
legal misconception, court instructions often exacerbate
it by leaving jurors confused.
Of course, the significance of juror understanding of capital instructions and the nature of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances is only amplified by the
expansion of the jurors’ role in capital sentencing. Indeed, as some point out: “[t]he logic followed in Ring
highlights the importance that the Court assigns to the
way in which judges and jurors use aggravating and mitigating circumstances to reach penalty decisions.”64
Given the increasing centrality of jurors in the
capital sentencing process, and the strong academic evidence of juror confusion regarding sentencing generally
and mitigation specifically, it is not surprising that a
number of cases have advanced to the Supreme Court
for review hinging on the role and definition of mitigation, for example: Franklin v. Lynaugh 65; Buchanan v.
Angelone66; Boyde v. California67; and Weeks v. Angelone.68 In one aggravation case Francis v. Franklin,69
Rehnquist found himself advancing an argument that
pertinent instructions need not be clarified, amplified,
defined, or sometimes even mentioned.70 In the four
cases Scalia participated in, and in the two Thomas took
part in, they shared Rehnquist’s conclusion. More to the
point, over time, the conservatives’ perspective on capital jury instructions has become the Court’s perspective.
The capital prosecution of Raymond Franklin
hinged on the defendant’s intent. To win a jury verdict
of malicious murder in Georgia, and to pursue a death
sentence, prosecutors had to prove Franklin intended to
kill his victim.
Franklin was imprisoned for a non-capital offense when he was taken, shackled and guarded, to a
civilian dentist.71 Temporarily unshackled while in the
dentist’s office, Franklin was able to take an officer’s
gun and alight with a hostage from the dental office.72
Franklin made several unsuccessful efforts to steal a
car.73 Franklin and the hostage eventually walked to a
nearby home where Franklin knocked on the door and
demanded the resident’s car keys.74 The resident
slammed the door, after which Franklin fired the gun
twice.75 Both shots went through the door; the first
killed the homeowner, the second lodged in the home’s
ceiling.76
Franklin’s entire defense was lack of intent.77
He claimed that the shooting was not intentional, pointing to the fact that neither the people he encountered on
Winter 2009

the street nor his hostage were harmed.78 The fact that Rehnquist, it would appear, the standard for an unconthe second shot went into the ceiling, Franklin claimed, stitutional instruction must demonstrate it to be not only
was evidence that he was not attempting to kill the vic- unconstitutional but also verbose.
In fact, Rehnquist conceded that a “technical
tim.79
The aggravation instructions given to the jury analysis of the charge…from a legal standpoint” would
addressed the issue of intent.80 One hour into their guilt support the Court’s conclusion that the instructions were
phase deliberations the jury asked for further instruc- misleading.92 However, no “reasonable juror” could
tions on the issue of intent and the definition of acci- have read the instructions closely enough to form the
dent.81 After hearing the original instructions repeated misimpression the Court posits.93 Indeed, Rehnquist
the jury deliberated for ten additional minutes before re- suggested “the Court is attributing qualities to the averturning a guilty verdict.82 Franklin was sentenced to age juror that are found in very few lawyers.”94
death the next day.83
Brennan took suspicious note of Rehnquist’s
conclusion that jurors would not
Franklin’s attorneys argued that the jury instructions inRehnquist did not find have paid enough attention to the
verted the burden of proving
instructions to be affected by the
the burden of disprov- contradiction. In a previous case,
intent and placed that burden on
the defense, and Justice Brennan,
v. Randolph, in which the
ing intent to be placed Parker
prosecution’s argument hinged on
writing for a five to four majority,
on the defense because close juror attention to the instrucagreed; he wrote that the instructions, Rehnquist was burdened by
tion on intent “violate[d] the
at
any
given
moment
no doubts regarding juror rigor.
Fourteenth Amendment’s rethe
prosecution
could
Rehnquist wrote for the Court,
quirement that the State prove
“[a] crucial assumption underlying
every element of a criminal ofswitch
sides
and
at[trial by jury] is that juries will folfense beyond a reasonable
tempt to present a case low the instructions given them by
doubt.”84 The instruction created
a “mandatory presumption”
the trial judge. Were this not so, it
disproving
intent.
where proving the act (firing the
would be pointless for a trial court
gun) in effect established the into instruct a jury, and even more
tent and that “a reasonable juror” would understand the pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal coninstructions to shift “to the respondent the burden of per- viction because the jury was improperly instructed.”95
suasion on the element of intent once the State had Thus, Brennan chides, “[a]pparently [Rehnquist] would
have the degree of attention a juror is presumed to pay
proved the predicate acts.”85
The Court emphasized the phrase “may be re- to particular jury instructions vary with whether a prebutted” implied that it was the defendant’s burden to es- sumption of attentiveness would help or harm the crimtablish that an intent “inference was unwarranted.”86 inal defendant.”96
Separately, the instructions did note, “criminal intention
Instead of burdening the defense with disproving
87
may not be presumed.” But Brennan concluded that intent, Rehnquist concluded the typical juror would have
the language “merely contradicts” but does not “ab- approached the situation far differently. Rehnquist
solve” the instruction’s infirmity.88 Indeed, he noted, “a wrote: “[t]he reasonable interpretation of the challenged
reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the charge is that…the presumption could be rebutted by
two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in the circumstances surrounding the acts, whether prereaching their verdicts.”89
sented by the State or the defendant.”97 In other words,
Rehnquist’s dissent was incredulous, stating, Rehnquist did not find the burden of disproving intent
“today the Court sets aside Franklin’s murder convic- to be placed on the defense because at any given motion…because this Court concludes that one or two sen- ment the prosecution could switch sides and attempt to
tences out of several pages of instructions given by the present a case disproving intent.
While the minority in this case, Rehnquist’s unjudge” lowered the state’s burden of proof.90 Indeed,
later in his dissent Rehnquist explicitly stated: “due derlying conclusion, that the Court must raise the bar
process is not violated in every case where an isolated for defendants to demonstrate faulty instructions, would
sentence implicates constitutional problems.”91 To ultimately take hold and be applied in mitigation instrucCriminal Law Brief
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tion cases. As he suggested in his dissent, “it must at
least be likely” rather than a reasonable possibility that
instructions led jurors to misapply the law before the
Court should intervene.98
As Brennan noted, such a standard would leave
the Court an “impressionistic and intuitive” task to deign
what path jurors followed in cases such as Francis v.
Franklin when the instructions contained a contradiction.99 This is despite what Brennan called a settled
precedent that verdicts must be set aside when there is
a reasonable possibility that jurors based their verdict
on an unconstitutional understanding of law .100
In a Texas capital case, Franklin v. Lynaugh101
the sentencing jury was instructed to return a death sentence if they found two specific aggravating factors: that
the murder was deliberate and that the defendant represented a continuing threat.102 The instructions made no
mention of the concept of mitigation.103
The issue before the Court was whether the instructions afforded the defendant an adequate opportunity to have mitigating evidence weighed by the jury in
its sentencing deliberations.104 In a decision written by
Justice White, and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, a plurality of the Court found the instructions adequate.105 Justice White noted that the
judge’s instructions told the jury to base their verdict
“on all the evidence.”106 Thus, even though mitigation
was never mentioned, that general instruction carried
with it the obligation to weigh mitigating evidence.
The entirety of the defense’s mitigation presentation was Franklin’s prison record, which revealed that
he was not a violent inmate.107 “We are thus quite sure
that the jury’s consideration of petitioner’s prison record
was not improperly limited,” White wrote, because the
jury was “free to weigh and evaluate” that record.108
In reality, though, the standard advanced by
White and the plurality was not based on any demonstrable indication that the jury did weigh the mitigating
evidence, but rather by their conclusion that weighing
such evidence was possible. White wrote, “[w]e do not
believe that the jury instructions or the Texas Special Issues precluded jury consideration of any relevant mitigating circumstances in this case.”109
Given the Texas instructions, Stevens’ dissent
questioned how a defendant, with a clearly established
right to present mitigating evidence reflecting upon any
factor relevant to his life, could possibly have that evidence be properly weighed when the jury entered deliberations with only two questions before them.110 “A
sentencing jury must be given the authority to reject im76

position of the death penalty on the basis of any evidence relevant to the defendant’s character or record or
the circumstances of the offense proffered by the defendant in support of a sentence less than death. That rule
does not merely require that the jury be allowed to hear
any such evidence the defendant desires to introduce, it
also requires that the jury be allowed to give ‘independent mitigating weight’ to the evidence.”111
Stevens argued that by not offering an instruction on the application of mitigation, the judge had, in
effect, told the jury to ignore such evidence. “The failure
to give such an instruction removed that evidence from
the sentencer’s consideration just as effectively as would
have an instruction informing the jury that petitioner’s
character was irrelevant to its sentencing decision.”112
In fact, in her concurring opinion, O’Connor admitted
that the implied legal relevance of mitigation seems limited only to direct responses to the aggravating factors.113
Ten years later the Virginia Court considered a
very similar case. In Buchanan v. Angelone, the judge
presented capital sentencing instructions to the jury
without mention of mitigation.114 Instead, the judge instructed the jury to weigh whether the crime was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.”115 If
they agreed it was, the jury would then deliberate on
whether a death sentence was appropriate. Again, the
judge instructed jurors to consider “all the evidence.”116
As in Franklin v. Lynaugh, the defense unsuccessfully sought a set of instructions explaining mitigation.117 Further the defense asked that jurors be
instructed that if they found the factor to mitigate against
the death penalty then they “shall consider that fact in
deciding whether to impose a sentence of death or life
imprisonment.”118
In a six to three decision, the Court again found
that lack of instructions on the concept of mitigation and
mitigating factors does not violate due process or cruel
and unusual punishment.119 Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Rehnquist emphasized that while any death sentence deliberation must be a “broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence,” there is no “particular way”
juries should consider such evidence.120 Adhering to the
Franklin v. Lynaugh plurality, Rehnquist here noted that
the jury was told to “base its decision on ‘all the evidence,’” thus affording “jurors an opportunity to consider mitigating evidence.”121
Rehnquist argued that the amount of mitigating
evidence presented to the jury indicates that the jury
gave weight to that evidence. That is, because the jury
heard two days of testimony on defendant’s background
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and mental problems, “it is not likely that the jury would
disregard this extensive testimony in making its decision, particularly given the instruction to consider ‘all
the evidence.’”122 Of course, Rehnquist came to the
same conclusion when the jury was presented with almost no mitigating evidence in Franklin v. Lynaugh.123
One fundamental fact here and in related cases
is that the Court’s certainty regarding juror understanding does not rely on direct evidence. That is, no one
bothered to ask the jurors if they understood the instructions to ensure that the mitigating evidence was properly
considered. No one bothered to test these instructions
to see if ordinary laypersons could understand them.
Meanwhile, in a concurring opinion, Scalia
agreed that juror instructions need not explain mitigation. He offered this conclusion not because the relevance of mitigation is obvious in its presentation, or
established inside the phrase “all the evidence,” but
rather because juries need not “be given discretion to
consider mitigating evidence.”124 Indeed, Scalia found
fault not only with mitigation, but also with the entire
bifurcated process; “drawing an arbitrary line in the sand
between the ‘eligibility and selection phases’ of the sentencing decision is, in [his] view, incoherent and ultimately doomed to failure.”125
In the dissent, as in Franklin v. Lynaugh, Breyer
argued that since the only question put to jurors involved
aggravating circumstances, jurors would reasonably
apply mitigating information only to the extent it directly helped them decide upon the aggravating evidence.
Breyer questioned how jurors were to
operationalize the mitigating evidence, noting that the
jury instructions at issue “tell the jury that evidence of
mitigating circumstances (concerning, say, the defendant’s childhood and his troubled relationships with the
victims) is not relevant to their sentencing decision.”126
Unless the jury was “made up of experienced
death penalty lawyers …parsing the instructions in a
highly complicated, technical way that they alone are
likely to understand” then “a natural reading of the language” would seem to foreclose the application of mitigation.127 Breyer made a rather simple suggestion for
changing the instructions: “mention of mitigating evidence anywhere in the instructions” would clear things
up.128
In directly competing interpretations, Rehnquist
and Breyer attempt to show how each other’s conclusion
is a “strained parsing” of the instruction.129 They debate,
among other matters, the relative weight of the instruction’s use of the words “if” and “or.” It is an amusing
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colloquy between two jurists quibbling over language –
at least it would be if a person’s life did not hang in the
balance.130
What the exchange proves, however, is that one
judge with the aid of a team of law clerks does not interpret a jury instruction the same way as another – and
his own team of law clerks – does. If justices on the
Court cannot agree on an interpretation, how can laypersons with no legal training be presumed to do so?
California’s capital instructions in place at the
time Richard Boyde was tried did mention mitigation.131
The instructions featured eleven factors – lettered a
through k – the jury should consider before deciding
upon a sentence: the first eight factors essentially established possible aggravating circumstances, and the ninth
and tenth factors established two specific forms of mitigating circumstances, neither of which applied to
Boyde.132 The eleventh – factor k, as it was referred to
– instructed the jury to consider “any other circumstance
which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though
it is not a legal excuse for the crime.”133 After deciding
upon the factors, the jury was told to determine if the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances, and if so, then “you shall impose a sentence of death.” 134
The issue before the Court was whether the
wording of the mitigation instruction narrowly focused
the jury’s attention on the crime, thus undermining the
value of the mitigation evidence regarding Boyde’s personal background and troubled childhood that was the
focus of his defense.135 Boyde also argued that the “shall
impose” language created a limit on juror discretion to
support a life sentence regardless of the aggravation/mitigation equation.136
In a five to four decision written by Rehnquist
and joined by Scalia the Court upheld the instructions.137
Rehnquist admitted the instructions could be considered
“ambiguous.”138 But as was the case in Buchanan v. Angelone, he argued that surely the presentation of mitigating evidence implied its relevance.139 Further, the
jury was free to consider any information and decide
that it somehow applied “to the crime.”140
Thus, Rehnquist concluded that the jury’s interpretation of the instructions as limiting their attention to
information directly relevant to the crime was “only a
possibility.”141 Instead, building on his dissent in Francis v. Franklin, Rehnquist argued that the Court needed
to be concerned about instructions only when there is a
“reasonable likelihood that the jury as a whole applied
instructions as the defendant asserted.”142 “Finality and
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accuracy,” Rehnquist wrote, are better established by a where misconceptions go to die, but rather a forum
focus on the likely conclusions of the entire jury rather where preconceived notions and faulty instructions can
than considering “how a single hypothetical ‘reasonable wreak havoc with legal process.151
Indeed, Rehnquist cited no evidence that would
juror’ could or might have interpreted the instruction.”143
This evolving standard for juror confusion con- suggest “commonsense” understandings would prevail;
tinues to have tremendous implications. In previous more importantly, he fails to mention exactly what a
cases, including Francis v. Franklin, the Court dealt commonsense understanding of the instructions might
with instructions that “a reasonable juror” could rely look like. As is readily apparent from the instruction,
upon to impose an unconstitutional judgment.144 Here the language, syntax, and structure are not what layperthe Court applies a standard requiring that jury instruc- sons generally encounter, so it is hard to understand how
tions create a “likelihood that
they might have come to a
“commonsense” interpretation.
the jury” has applied an unconPeople
do
not
view
“the
145
stitutional standard.
In the dissent, Marshall
Beyond dismissing the
seriousness of a crime as lamented the lowering of the bar
significance of objections to infor instructions (or the raising of
dependent
upon
the
structions that are potentially
the bar for challenges to them).
misleading, the Court here
background and charac- Indeed, Marshall suggested the
moved to dismiss objections to
Court had created an ambiguous
ter
of
the
offender.
A
instructions which have misled
standard in reviewing ambigujurors (providing that some untypical juror would not, ous instructions, which can only
specified ratio of jurors were
result in “confusion.”152
for
example,
describe
a
Given that the only relenot misled). As Marshall noted
vant
mitigation
instruction “unin the dissent, “the majority reparticular murder as ‘a
ambiguously
refers
to
gards confidence” that individless serious crime’ beual jurors understood the
circumstances related to the
instructions “as unnecessary to
cause of the redeeming crime”153 Marshall questioned
how the majority could be conits affirmance of Boyde’s death
qualities of the murvinced that the jury gave weight
sentence.”146 Marshall argued
to mitigating evidence that was
that such a stance “reflects the
derer.” - Chief Justice
outside “the plain meaning of
Court’s growing and unjustified
Marshall
the factor’s language.”154 Peohostility to claims of constituple do not view “the seriousness
tional violation by capital deof a crime as dependent upon
fendants.”147
Apart from arguing that it is acceptable for some the background and character of the offender. A typical
jurors to act based on an unconstitutional standard, juror would not, for example, describe a particular murRehnquist essentially sent the Court down the very dif- der as ‘a less serious crime’ because of the redeeming
ficult path of determining precisely what percentage of qualities of the murderer.”155
For Marshall, “when we tolerate the possibility
a jury was misled by an instruction. How the court is to
148
Ironi- of error in capital proceedings and leave people in
determine this percentage is not spelled out.
cally, given he has created a standard based on guess- doubt,” we step toward the death penalty process the
work, Rehnquist then mocked the defense claim of juror Court had found “discriminatory” and “intolerable” in
confusion because it “amounts to no more than specu- Furman v. Georgia.156
Instead of the obvious course of action – conlation.”149
Part of the distinction Rehnquist made between fronting head-on the ambiguity of the instructions and
juror confusion and jury confusion was based on the conceding that a layperson could easily produce an unconclusion that the deliberation process allows juries to constitutional application of those instructions – Rehnrise above confusing instructions because the group will quist chose to instead speculate about whether it was
ultimately arrive at a “commonsense understanding of likely that the jury interpreted the instructions unconstithe instructions.”150 By contrast, academic research tutionally.157 This does not seem to be a jurisprudence
shows the deliberation process is by no means a place aimed at ensuring a meaningful right to a jury but,
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rather, a jurisprudence of protecting the legal system
from legitimate questions. In addition, as the dissent
noted, “[i]t is an essential corollary of our reasonabledoubt standard in criminal proceedings that a conviction, capital or otherwise, cannot stand if the jury’s
verdict could have rested on unconstitutional
grounds.”158
The fact that Rehnquist, in establishing the “reasonable likelihood” standard, is more worried about protecting the system against attack rather than supporting
a meaningful right to a jury is confirmed when he wrote
about two “strong policies” of the Court: one in favor
of “accurate determination of the appropriate sentence
in a capital case” and the other, which he wrote is
“equally strong”, “against retrials years after the first
trial where the claimed error amounts to no more than
speculation.”159 Rehnquist’s commentary on the Court’s
two “equally strong” policies begs the question: when
the two policies conflict, which one wins? Rehnquist
found getting it over with more persuasive than ensuring
that the capital defendant receives a meaningful right to
a jury trial.
Despite the Court’s support for its instructions,
state legislators in California ultimately rewrote the mitigation language in their statute. Beyond the original
language of factor k referring to “any other circumstance
which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though
it is not a legal excuse for the crime,” the new instructions included the requirement that jurors note “any
sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character
or record . . . whether or not related to the offense for
which he is on trial.”160
In many respects a perfect culmination of this
line of controversy occurred in Weeks v. Angelone.161
Again the issue centered on how to consider mitigation.
On this occasion, however, there was no need to speculate on whether “a reasonable juror” was confused, or if
there was a “reasonable likelihood” the jury was confused, because the jury announced that it was confused.162
The defendant, Lonnie Weeks in the case confessed the day after the crime to killing a police officer.163 Arrested the day after the crime, Lonnie Weeks
quickly confessed and expressed remorse.164 Weeks articulated the desire to commit suicide because of his actions.165
The judge informed the jury that if they found
aggravation “then you may fix the punishment at death,
or if you believe from all the evidence that the death
penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment
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at life imprisonment.”166
After four hours of deliberation, the jury asked
whether their deliberation was complete if it did find aggravation, or if it then still had to weigh whether a death
sentence was appropriate:
If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr. is
guilty of at least 1 of the [aggravating
factors], then is it our duty as a jury to
issue the death penalty? Or must we decide . . . whether or not to issue the death
penalty, or one of the life sentences?
What is the rule? Please clarify?167
The defense asked the judge to instruct the jury
that even if they found aggravation beyond a reasonable
doubt they could still impose a life sentence. The judge
declined, instead repeating the original instruction without clarification. The judge noted, “I don’t believe I can
answer the question any clearer than the instruction.”168
The jury deliberated for two additional hours before returning a death sentence.
In another five to four decision written by Rehnquist, joined by Scalia and Thomas, the Court found the
instruction “constitutionally sufficient.”169 Again, the
Court admitted the jury might have fundamentally misunderstood its charge stating: “there exists a slight possibility that the jury considered itself precluded from
considering mitigating evidence.”170 However, Rehnquist rebutted that fear because “a jury is presumed to
follow its instructions” and “to understand a judge’s answer to its question.”171
Thus, the Court took the position that the jury
must have understood the instruction because the jury
openly asked for help upon receiving nothing more than
the original instruction.
Moreover, Rehnquist advanced what he called
“empirical” evidence of juror understanding; since the
jurors spent more than two hours deliberating after the
judge’s answer, they must have understood its meaning.172
Presumably, if the jury had returned almost immediately after the instruction Rehnquist would have
seen that as evidence that the Jury had clearly understood the instruction because they were able to act so
swiftly. This is no mere speculation, as ten minutes of
deliberation following a jury question in Francis v.
Franklin was considered to be evidence of juror understanding in Rehnquist’s dissent in that case.173 Here,
staying out two additional hours was evidence of under79

standing. It is interesting to consider what length of time
Rehnquist would possibly have seen as an indication of
misunderstanding. Indeed, it seems more likely that
Rehnquist has constructed an unfalsifiable standard
where brevity of deliberations suggests easily understood standards and prolonged deliberations establish
seriously undertaken discussion of evidence, but no
length of deliberations implies misunderstanding of instructions.
The majority further took as evidence of understanding the fact that the jury “did not inform the court
that after reading the relevant paragraph of instruction,
it still did not understand its role.”174 Indeed, Rehnquist
concluded, “This particular jury demonstrated that it
was not too shy to ask questions, suggesting that it
would have asked another if it felt the judge’s response
unsatisfactory.”175 In other words, after the jury directly
asked for clarification it did not receive, the Court takes
the jury’s lack of inclination to ask the exact same question again as evidence of understanding, though repeating the question would logically have resulted in the
same non-answer.176
Stevens asked in his dissent, “if the jurors found
it necessary to ask the judge what that paragraph meant
in the first place, why should we presume that they
would find it any less ambiguous just because the judge
told them to read it again?”177 Moreover, he questioned
attaching any significance to the jury’s failure to repeat
the question: “It seems to me far more likely that the
reason they did not ask the same question a second time
is that the jury believed that it would be disrespectful to
repeat a simple, unambiguous question that the judge
had already refused to answer directly.”178
Similarly intriguing is the notion that the jury’s
question ultimately lends confidence to Rehnquist’s
conclusion that the jury understood its instructions. If
the jury had never asked a question, it would have been
presumed to understand its instructions. If, instead, the
jury directly questioned an instruction fundamental to
their duty, expressing complete uncertainty about the
standard they were to apply and including the words,
“What is the rule? Please clarify?” upon which point
they received clarifying information, then the jury is presumed to understand its instructions. Even if, as in this
case, the jury posed that same question and received no
new information or clarification of any kind, the jury is
presumed to understand its instructions. Again, Rehnquist has advanced an unfalsifiable standard: not asking
a question is evidence of understanding, and asking a
question is also evidence of understanding.179
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Rehnquist’s powers of jury mind reading are not
limited to legal interpretation. The dissent noted that a
majority of jurors were in tears when the death sentence
was read, an unusual occurrence according to state court
officials.180 This suggests, suggesting to Stevens that
some may have felt that the sentence was inappropriate.
Rehnquist countered that the unusual tears reflected exhaustion and a belief that the defendant “deserved the
death sentence.”181 Rehnquist does not elaborate on why
what are presumably elements of nearly every jury death
sentence should produce tears only in this rare instance.
In the dissent, Stevens made a basic case for
“clarity – clarity in the judge’s instructions when there
is a reasonable likelihood that the jury may misunderstand the governing rule of law.”182
Even with the high standard for demonstrating
juror confusion, Stevens argued that “this case establishes, not just a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of jury confusion, but a virtual certainty that the jury did not realize
that there were two distinct legal bases for concluding
that a death sentence was not ‘justified.’”183 That is, the
jury could find aggravation had not been proved, or if
aggravation had been proved, it could find the death
penalty was not warranted after weighing mitigation. In
contrast to Rehnquist’s position that the jury’s question
demonstrated understanding, “[t]he fact that the jurors
asked this question about that instruction demonstrates
beyond peradventure that the instruction had confused
them. There would have been no reason to ask the question if they had understood the instruction to authorize
a life sentence even though they found that an aggravator had been proved.”184
Given that the judge provided the confused jury
no new information, Stevens asked where the majority
found confidence that the jury was “magically satisfied
by the repetition of the instruction that had not heretofore answered its question.”185 Stevens posited that “a
non-lawyer” would have concluded death was the only
available sentence if aggravation had been proved.
There was simply “no reason to believe that the jury understood the judge’s answer to its question” and therefore “overwhelming grounds for reversal.”186
Ultimately, Stevens, like Breyer in the Buchanan dissent, called for the “easy” step of giving the jury a
“straightforward categorical answer to their simple
question.”187
Would Weeks’ have received a death sentence if
the jury had understood its duty to determine both aggravation and, separately, whether the sentence was warranted? A team of academics took up the question.
Winter 2009

Using jury eligible subjects, researchers created a series When jurors are asked to decide whether to impose a
of simulated sentencing deliberations.188 In each, sub- death sentence, the alternative typically available to
jects were given information on the case and the instruc- them is to impose a life sentence. What “life sentence”
tions provided by the judge.189 But three different means provokes wildly different interpretations from juconditions were created with regard to the question on rors – and those beliefs are crucial to their sentencing
whether they needed to deliberate past finding aggrava- preferences. The belief that a “life sentence” is for a petion.190 The first group was never told of the jury’s ques- riod of less than life dramatically increases the likelition in Weeks and asked to deliberate based on the hood that a person will favor imposing a death
original instructions.191 The second group was told of sentence.199 Indeed, interviews with former capital case
the jury’s question, and, as occurred in the case, was pro- jurors confirmed that the less time they understood a life
vided a second reading of the original instructions.192 sentence to require the more likely they were to support
The third group was told of the jury’s question and pro- a death verdict.200
vided a plain language answer that they must deliberate
As was the case with the meaning and import of
on the question of whether to
mitigation, the definition of a
impose death even if they find
sentence was discussed in the
At
least
half
of
the
subjects
193
aggravation.
case in which the Court
in the first two groups
The results were quite
brought the death penalty
clear. At least half of the subback into legal use. In Gregg
thought
that
finding
aggrajects in the first two groups
v. Georgia, the Court dethought that finding aggravavation ended the need for clared that the Eighth
tion ended the need for deliberAmendment demands that judeliberation
and
established
ation and established the
rors are given “accurate senEven
penalty at death.194
the penalty at death. Even tencing information” because
among the third group, given a
it is “an indispensable prereqamong the third group,
plain language instruction that
uisite to a reasoned determithis was not true, one-fourth of
given a plain language in- nation of whether a defendant
the subjects held the same beshall live or die.”201
struction
that
this
was
not
195
More significantly,
In the four cases highlief.
among those who correctly untrue, one-fourth of the sub- lighted below (California v.
derstood the obligation, a maRamos202; Simmons v. South
jects held the same belief. Carolina203; Shafer v. South
jority favored a life sentence.196
Regardless of the realCarolina204; Kelly v. South
205
ity of studies like the one described above, Franklin v. Carolina ), the issue turned on juror understanding of
Lynaugh , Buchanan v. Angelone, Boyde v. California, the sentences they might impose. In the latter three
Weeks v. Angelone, and Francis v. Franklin establish a cases, Scalia and Thomas dissented and made clear that
successful effort on the part of Rehnquist, joined by they found no need to make plain to the jurors the meanScalia and Thomas, to establish two pillars that now un- ing of the sentence they were considering; Rehnquist
dergird the Court’s approach to jury instructions in cap- joined their position in the final case. In the first case,
ital cases. First, whether the instructions are clear or in which only Rehnquist participated, he joined a maunclear, consistent or contradictory, explicit or unmen- jority advancing the notion that the state may assert life
tioned, jurors can be expected to understand their duties. sentences are something less than life sentences.
In typical criminal trials, jurors must determine
Second, even if the Court identifies “one or two sentences”197 of unconstitutional instructions, or find evi- guilt or innocence. The length or nature of the sentence
dence that a “reasonable juror”198 was misled, the a defendant might face if found guilty is legally irreleinstruction is still tolerable.
vant to jury proceedings. Were the jurors to inquire
about punishment, they would be told that punishment
is not for their consideration.
defining a sentence
While capital jurors are apt to be confused by inIn capital trials, jurors determine not only guilt
structions regarding the sentencing decision, they are or innocence, but they also impose a sentence. While
similarly flummoxed by the sentences themselves. telling jurors not to concern themselves with punishCriminal Law Brief
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ment may be a legally sound practice in other cases, in
many jurisdictions it is also the default practice in capital cases in many jurisdictions. That is, even though
they are explicitly deciding upon a sentence, in effect
jurors are commonly told not to concern themselves
with the actual meaning of the sentence.206
As such, when they ask if a “life sentence”
means a term of life, or if it is for some shorter period,
or if they ask whether parole is possible, jurors’ questions often go unanswered. This despite the fact that
confusion about these terms is widespread, and in some
jurisdictions the meaning of “life sentence” has changed
dramatically in recent years.
In Simmons v. South Carolina, among the reasons the state argued Jonathan Simmons should get the
death penalty was that he posed a future threat. Executing Simmons, the prosecutor said, “[would] be an act of
self-defense” for society.207 Jurors deliberating on Simmons’ sentence were asked to choose between death and
a sentence of life imprisonment, and in doing so, the jurors asked if the defendant was eligible for parole.208
The judge not only refused to answer directly, but he
had previously barred the defense from mentioning Simmons parole ineligibility during the proceedings.209
Blackmun wrote for the Court’s plurality that
misunderstanding a “life sentence” created “a false
dilemma” between a death sentence and a sentence to a
“limited period of incarceration.”210 Given that the prosecution argued that the defendant would be a danger to
society, the defendant had a due process right to inform
the jury that a life sentence would result in his imprisonment for the rest of his life because “in assessing future dangerousness, the actual duration of the
defendant’s prison sentence is indisputably relevant.”211
It seems well established that the meaning of a
“life sentence” was not commonly understood in the
state. The defense presented contemporary polling data
showing only seven percent of jury eligible South Carolinians thought a life sentence carried with it a term of
life.212 Nearly half thought a life sentence was twenty
years or less, nearly three in four thought it was thirty
years or less.213
Thus, it was not entirely surprising when, after
90 minutes of deliberation, the jury asked, “Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of
parole?”214
The judge replied: “You are instructed not to
consider parole or parole eligibility in reaching your verdict. Do not consider parole or parole eligibility. That
is not a proper issue for your consideration. The terms
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life imprisonment and death sentence are to be understood in their plain and ordinary meaning.”215
Given that ninety-three percent of state residents
did not know what the plain and ordinary meaning of
“life imprisonment” was, the response was less than illuminating.216 As Justice Blackmun put it, the jury “was
denied a straight answer about petitioner’s parole eligibility even when it was requested.”217 Indeed, Blackmun concluded that the judge’s response not only did
not establish the truth about parole, but supported a misconception. “This instruction actually suggested that
parole was available, but that the jury, for some unstated
reason, should be blind to this fact. Undoubtedly, the
instruction was confusing and frustrating to the jury.”218
Twenty- five minutes after hearing the judge’s
response, the jury sentenced Simmons to death.219
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, offered
a dissent. Scalia questioned the relevance of the parole
issue and the future dangerousness argument. “I am sure
it was the sheer depravity of those crimes, rather than
any specific fear for the future, which induced the South
Carolina jury to conclude that the death penalty was justice.”220 It would be “quite farfetched” to think parole
was a significant matter for the jury.221 If that were true,
and parole was very irrelevant, one must wonder why
the prosecution vociferously objected to the jury being
told parole was not available.
Moreover, why would the jury ask about parole
if its deliberations were not in any way affected by questions related to when the defendant might gain freedom
and what he might do under those conditions? Further,
if the future dangerousness of the defendant was irrelevant to the jury, why did the prosecution bother making
the argument, and how is Scalia in a better position to
determine the value of the argument to the jury than the
prosecutor who handled the case?
Nevertheless, Scalia asserted that the prosecutor’s claim that executing Simmons will be “an act of
self defense” was irrelevant to the jurors. “This reference to ‘self-defense’ obviously alluded neither to defense of the jurors’ own persons, nor specifically to
defense of persons outside the prison walls, but to defense of all members of society against this individual,
wherever he or they might be.”222 How a phrase could
allude to “all members of society” without alluding to
the jurors and other “persons outside prison walls” is
something of a semantic mystery.
Beyond making the case that the parole issue
was irrelevant, Scalia asserted that there was also a matter of fundamental fairness here. “Preventing the deWinter 2009

fense from introducing evidence regarding parolability
is only half of the rule that prevents the prosecution from
introducing it as well.”223
Just to be clear, Scalia has argued that not allowing the defense to define the true meaning of a life sentence is fair because the prosecution, were they to switch
sides during the trial in an attempt to aid the defense,
would also be prohibited from defining the life sentence.
This is the companion argument to the assertion that
Rehnquist made in Francis v. Franklin that both the defense and prosecution were free to demonstrate the defendant lacked intent to kill. Apparently prosecutors
switching sides in the middle of a trial must be fairly
common, although it a phenomenon known only to the
Court’s most conservative members. 224
Ultimately, Scalia’s dissent suggested his objection was less to the Court’s conclusion than to its larger
implications for executions. The Court’s standard is a
“reasonable as a matter of policy,” he wrote, but sadly
represents “another front in the guerilla war to make this
unquestionably constitutional sentence a practical impossibility.”225
Seven years after Simmons the Court dealt with
nearly the same question in another South Carolina capital case. In Shafer v. South Carolina (2001)226 the judge
again provided sentencing instructions without defining
life imprisonment. Despite the prosecution raising the
specter of future dangerousness, the defense was barred
from explaining to the jury that parole was not a possibility. The judge also rejected the defense’s request that
the language of the applicable state statute be read to the
jury. [The statute explains that “‘life imprisonment’
means until death of the offender” and that there is no
possibility of parole, furlough, or any type or fashion of
release].
Again, confusion on the meaning of a life sentence ensued. About three and a half hours into deliberations the jury asked the judge: “Is there any remote
chance for someone convicted of murder to become eligible for parole?”227 The judge replied: “Parole eligibility or ineligibility is not for your consideration.”228
Eighty minutes later the jury returned with a death sentence. The defense asked that the jury be polled regarding their understanding of a life sentence, but the judge
refused.
Writing for a seven to two majority, Justice
Ginsburg concluded that the jury lacked “any clear understanding” of the life sentence they were meant to
weigh against a death sentence.229
In a rather astonishing dissent, Thomas, joined
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by Scalia, asserted there was no evidence of juror confusion. “I believe that the court’s instructions and the
arguments made by counsel in Shafer’s case were sufficient to inform the jury of what ‘life imprisonment’
meant for Shafer”230 and “left no room for speculation
by the jury”231 on meaning of life sentence.
What, then, did the jury mean to indicate when
it asked about the potential for the defendant to be released? “I can only infer that the jury’s questions regarding parole referred not to Shafer’s parole eligibility
in the event the jury sentenced Shafer to life, but rather
to his parole eligibility in the event it did not sentence
him at all.”232 In other words, Thomas takes the jury’s
direct question regarding their direct task, and concludes
they meant to inquire not about anything they were
doing but rather wished to clarify a point of law that they
had not raised and which had no bearing on them.
As was the case in Weeks v. Angelone, direct jury
questions on topics which are widely misunderstood are
taken here by Scalia and Thomas to be not so much indicators of confusion, but either indicators of understanding or interest in arcane legal points unrelated to
the jurors’ task.
The South Carolina legal system would produce
yet another iteration of this basic controversy one year
later. In Simmons, and again in Shafer, the Court had
clearly stated a defendant’s right to establish before the
jury that parole was unavailable in response to prosecution efforts to establish future dangerousness. In Kelly233
the state claimed, (and the trial judge agreed,) it had
made no effort to establish future dangerousness and
therefore no mention of parole ineligibility was warranted.
The Court, in a five to four decision, took note
of the prosecutor’s repeated characterizations of the defendant William Kelly. The prosecutor called Kelly
“Bloody Billy,”234 the “Butcher of Batesburg,”235 and
noted he was “more frightening than a serial killer.”236
The prosecutor warned “murderers will be murderers
and he is there is a cold-blooded one right over there.”237
Souter, writing for the Court, highlighted several such examples as well as the overall thrust of the
prosecutor’s presentation and concluded: “the evidence and argument . . . …are flatly at odds with the
view that ‘future dangerousness was not an issue in
this case.’”238
Justice Rehnquist in his dissent disputed the notion that future dangerousness came up in the case.
“The prosecutor did not argue future dangerousness . . .
…in any meaningful sense of that term.”239 Curiously,
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Rehnquist admitted that “the prosecutor’s arguments cannot argue that the Constitution prohibits the State
about the details of the murder, as well as the violent from accurately characterizing its sentencing
episodes in prison, demonstrated petitioner’s evil char- choices.”245
The Court apparently had no concern that the
acter.”240 Thus, as Rehnquist would have it, the prosecutor sought and successfully established the sentence of death – which carries with it the precise
defendant’s credentials for evil status, but somehow ap- equivalent legal possibility of commutation – is in any
parently implied his evilness had expired and carried no way misleading because it too can result ultimately in
implications for the future.
the defendant being set free. As Marshall argued in the
Thomas, joined by Scalia, offered a separate dis- dissent, “the instruction thus erroneously suggests to the
sent, not to dispute whether future dangerousness was jury that a death sentence will assure the defendant’s
raised in the case, but to reaffirm his position that the permanent removal from society whereas the alternative
defendant should have no right to reveal parole infor- sentence will not.”246
Stevens argued in the dissent that the Court
mation regardless of prosecution arguments.
While Simmons, Shafer, and Kelly fought over should show no tolerance for biased jury instructions.
the state not providing information about life sentences, “No matter how trivial the impact of the instruction may
be, it is fundamentally wrong for the
California v. Ramos (1983)241
centered on the state giving addiThe Court apparently presiding judge at the trial - who
tional information about life senshould personify the evenhanded adhad
no
concern
that
tences. In short, California law
ministration of justice” to provide
required the judge to inform the the sentence of death – the jury one-sided information.247
sentencing jury in a capital case
As in Ramos, in Lowenfield
which
carries
with
it
that if they sentenced the defenv. Phelps (1988)248 leeway that was
dant to life imprisonment the
the precise equivalent denied to the defense was generously
state’s governor could commute
provided to the state. In Lowenfield,
legal possibility of
a capital jury spent thirteen hours in
the sentence to a shorter term.
Ramos’ attorney argued
commutation – is in sentencing deliberation and reported
to the judge that they had reached a
such an instruction invited the
any way misleading deadlock. At one point, the jury rejury to speculate, and was biased
expeagainst the defendant because
because it too can re- ported to the judge that it was
riencing “much distress.”249 The
there was no mention of the fact
sult ultimately in the judge replied: “I order you to go
that the governor had the same
power to commute a death sendefendant being set back to the jury room and to250deliberate and arrive at a verdict.”
tence.
free.
Later, when the jury again reIn a five to four decision,
ported difficulty, the judge twice
the Court found the instruction
permissible. O’Connor wrote for a majority which in- polled the jurors to ask if further deliberations would be
cluded Rehnquist. Commutation “information is rele- useful, – and reminded the jurors for what would be the
vant and factually accurate,” O’Connor argued.242 fourth time since the conclusion of the case that if they
“Informing the jury of the Governor’s power to com- failed to reach a verdict the defendant would be senmute a sentence of life without possibility of parole is tenced to life imprisonment. The judge’s polls, which
merely an accurate statement of a potential sentencing required the jurors to sign their name to their vote, in efalternative, and corrects the misconception conveyed by fect forced the jurors to take a position on the verdict
the phrase ‘life imprisonment without possibility of pa- since further deliberations were necessary for a death
role.’”243
sentence. After the first poll found eight in favor of conIndeed, the Court went on to assert that without tinuing deliberations, the judge repeated the process and
this information “life imprisonment without possibility found eleven in favor of continuing deliberations. Just
of parole” would create a “misleading impression” that thirty minutes after the polls the jury returned a death
release was impossible.244 The commutation instruction sentence. Despite the seemingly tilted nature of the
“dispels that possible misunderstanding” leaving little judge’s instructions, his command to continue deliberroom for the defense to object as “surely, the respondent ating, and his repeated admonitions on the consequences
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of deadlock (“Ladies and Gentlemen, as I instructed you
earlier if the jury is unable to unanimously agree on a
recommendation the Court shall impose the sentence of
Life Imprisonment”),251 Rehnquist wrote for the Court
that while the judge’s instruction “suggests the possibility of coercion” the instruction was “not ‘coercive’ in
such a way” as to deny the defendant’s rights.252
Ultimately, the conservative judges proved
themselves willing to tolerate sentencing definition rules
which tend to establish the defendant as a threat.
Whether that is through the withholding of information
pertaining to parole ineligibility, the one-sided presentation regarding commutation possibility, or the browbeating of a trial judge to push the jury out of its
deadlock, the jury instruction rules that the conservative
judges support consistently provide freedom for the
prosecution and limitation on the defense.
Even as the current Court majority has provided
for the defendant’s right to define parole ineligibility, it
is a narrow right. Only when the prosecution seeks to
establish future dangerousness, and only when life without possibility of parole is the sole available alternative
sentence does a defendant have a right to define the
meaning of life sentence. Even in that limited instance,
however, it is clear that the right is far from firmly established. Kelly produced only five votes for the defendant’s right to define life sentence, with two dissenters
(Thomas and Scalia) asserting there is no such right in
any circumstance.
Creating understandable instructions

given “instructions on the meaning of the legal terms
used”255 and when questions arise they should be answered directly. When the Simmons jury asked “Does
the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?” Souter wrote, “The answer here was
easy, and controlled by state statute. The judge should
have said no.”256 Concomitantly, in his dissent in Weeks,
Justice Stevens issued a call for “clarity”257 in jury instructions. Should the jury fail to understand and ask a
question, a “straightforward categorical answer” should
be provided.258 At the very least, Justice Breyer suggested it would be helpful if instructions on mitigation
included the “mention of mitigating evidence anywhere
in the instructions.”259
In their simulation using members of the jury
pool, one study found that rewriting juror instructions
in plain language improved juror comprehension scores
by twenty percent.260 Among the areas jurors showed the
most improvement on was the understanding of mitigation, including what counts as mitigation, what is the
standard for demonstrating mitigation, and whether
every juror must agree to apply the same mitigating
piece of evidence to find mitigation.261 Other researchers have also found significantly higher comprehension with plain language instructions.262
Another massive jury simulation tested not only
plain language instructions, but also a flowchart instruction, and instructions with specific clarifications on
common misconceptions.263 These various instruction
forms were tested against traditional instructions.264 The
plain language instructions had the most dramatic effect,
in some areas doubling comprehension rates on such
matters as mitigation.265 Other forms of instruction also
produced gains over the traditional instructions.266
While scholars have established both the depth
of misunderstanding in response to traditional juror instructions, as well as the promise of user-friendly instructions, the Court remains largely aloof. If the Court
is to give true effect to its expanding right to a jury,
though, it must turn away from its line of juror instruction cases in which it has established an expanding jurisprudence of permissible confusion.

Rehnquist wrote in Buchanan v. Angelone that
the jury could not have been confused because “the instruction presents a simple decisional tree.”253 He meant
that metaphorically. The practical meaning of the instructions in Buchanan would be difficult for any nonlawyer to explain. Indeed, there is no shortage of
evidence on the point that jurors have trouble understanding typical capital sentencing instructions.
Ironically, among the suggestions researchers
have made to improve comprehension of instructions is
to provide jurors with decision trees or flowcharts.254
That is to say, actual decision trees in which each plainly
JuRoR exClusion
worded question points the jurors to the next issue they
must decide, not metaphorical decision trees that exist
Belief exclusion
only in the mind of a Supreme Court justice.
Plain and direct language would also aid jurors
in carrying out their task. As Justice Souter argued in
Given the unique obligations of a capital case
his concurring opinion in Simmons, jurors should be juror, the Court has recognized the significant effect perCriminal Law Brief
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sonal values might have in inhibiting jurors from following their instructions and applying the law. In Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) and subsequent cases, the
Court concluded that a juror could be excluded from
participating in a capital case if his views “would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and
oath.”267
Such exclusion applies to both those who would
never impose the death penalty as well as those who
would always impose the death sentence in a capital
case. “[A] State may not entrust the determination of
whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized
to return a verdict of death.”268
To give effect to this requirement, prospective
jurors are questioned during voir dire to determine their
death penalty views and if those views would impair
their ability to reach a verdict based on the law and the
evidence at hand. In effect, the so-called “death qualification” process allows the prosecution to challenge for
cause and thereby remove prospective jurors who state,
for example, that they would never vote to impose the
death penalty, and the defense to challenge and remove
the comparatively rare individual who states they would
always vote to impose the death penalty.
While the concept of death qualification is relatively straightforward, the line between who is acceptable and who is not acceptable is not always clear, nor
are the parameters of the qualification process. Moreover, academic research makes it quite clear that death
qualification dramatically affects the makeup of juries
beyond its stated purpose.
Not surprisingly, those who can be excluded
based on their opposition to the death penalty are more
likely to pay attention to mitigating evidence269 and less
likely to accept the cost of convicting the innocent over
freeing the guilty.270 Notably, they are also less likely
to hold racist beliefs,271 more likely to remember evidence, accurately understand the law, and thoroughly
weigh the evidence.272
Even more to the point, contrary to the premise
of death qualification, evidence suggests that many excludables (those who may be excluded) who oppose the
death penalty would actually be willing to impose a
death sentence. That is, while excludables may report
an abstract unwillingness to impose the death penalty
sufficient to have them removed for cause from the jury,
when presented with evidence on specific cases, the majority report favoring the death penalty’s application for
particularly heinous murders.273
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Relative to excludables, includables (those who
may be included) meanwhile are conviction prone.
Meta-analyses of studies on death penalty includables
show they are up to forty percent more likely to favor
conviction in individual cases,274 while other studies reveal the difference is particularly great when the evidence is weakest.275
Among the factors in includables’ conviction
tendencies is their generally held belief that the prosecution is more trustworthy than the defense. One jury
simulation showed participants conflicting evidence variously supporting the prosecution or the defense’s position.276 Includables were far more likely to accept the
prosecution’s perspective; in contrast to excludables, includables were more likely to fear erroneous acquittals
than erroneous convictions.277
Meanwhile, contrary to the premise of their inclusion, more than one fourth of includables express the
belief that the death penalty should be imposed after
every capital case conviction.278
In each of the five death qualification cases discussed below Rehnquist supported an expansive prosecutorial right to cleanse the jury of death penalty
skeptics and a narrow defense right to purge the jury of
death penalty enthusiasts. In the three cases Scalia heard
and the one Thomas participated in, they joined Rehnquist’s position. Overall, the thrust of the conservatives’
position is what they consider to be the state’s right to
an impartial jury and generally cast a skeptical eye on
defendant’s countervailing claims.
In Adams v. Texas (1980)279 the judge asked jurors if they held any beliefs regarding the death penalty,
which would “affect their deliberations on any issue of
fact.”280 Jurors who said yes were excused.
The state argued this was a fair way to determine
death penalty excludables. The defense countered that
the state had re-written a standard which allowed people
to be excluded only if their views “would prevent or
substantially impair” them from carrying out their duties
to a new lower standard rejecting jurors who might be
affected in any way by the weight of a death proceeding.281
In an eight to one opinion (Rehnquist dissenting), the Court held that Texas law had created an unreasonable standard which had the effect of excluding
jurors “whose only fault was to take their responsibilities with special seriousness or to acknowledge honestly
that they might or might not be affected.”282
“Nervousness” and “emotional involvement”
were inherent in a death proceeding, the Court argued,
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thus the “inability to deny…any effect whatsoever” is
Some of the studies referred to in this chapter,
in no way “equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability [for example Cowan, Thompson and Ellsworth (1984)]
on the part of the jurors to follow the court’s instructions were before the Court then, but were deemed of no value
and obey their oaths.”283
because they were based on surveys and simulations,
In short, the Court reaffirmed that jurors may not not the deliberations of actual jurors hearing applicable
be excluded “on any broader basis than inability to fol- cases. [Of course, as Marshall pointed out in dissent,
low the law or abide by their oaths.”284
studying the deliberations of actual jurors in actual cases
In the dissent, Rehnquist said he could “see no is legally impossible, and not something any court
reason why Texas should not be entitled to require each would accommodate. Leaving surveys and simulations
juror to swear” that he or she will be unaffected by the “the only available means of proving their case.”]293
Rehnquist also dismissed McCree’s claim that
possibility of a death sentence.285 Further, foreshadowing an argument Scalia would offer in Holland v. Illi- he was denied a jury consisting of a “fair-cross-section”
nois, Rehnquist asserted, that “society, as much as the of society. 294 Death penalty excludables are not “a ‘disdefendant, has a right to an impartial jury.”286
tinctive’ group in the community[,]” thus McCree has
In Lockhart v. McCree (1986)287 the entire no right that they be included at any stage of the jury
process of death qualification was challenged as an im- process.295
pediment to an impartial jury reflecting a cross section
Oddly, Rehnquist made much of the fact that
of society. Before McCree’s capMcCree’s jury, which had been
ital murder trial, the judge resubject to death qualification,
In any given case,
moved for cause jurors who said
produced a panel which could
they could not impose death chance could produce an have been the product of the
penalty. The jury convicted Mc“luck of the draw.”296 Rehnquist
all
male
jury
or
an
all
Cree of murder but later senelaborated, “it is hard for us to
tenced him to life imprisonment.
white jury. Surely, the understand the logic of the arguMcCree’s attorneys argued that
ment that a given jury is unconfact
that
“mere
chance”
the death qualification process
stitutionally partial when it
had created a conviction prone
results from a state-ordained
could produce a panel
jury.
process, yet impartial when exwould not justify any
In a six to three opinion
actly the same jury results from
written by Rehnquist, the Court
mechanism of discrimi- mere chance.”297
In any given case, chance
found that death qualification did
nation
the
state
wished
could produce an all male jury or
not violate the defendant’s rights
an all white jury. Surely, the fact
because the Constitution “does
to create.
not require that petit juries actuthat “mere chance” could produce a panel would not justify
ally chosen reflect the composition of the community at large.”288 Moreover, death any mechanism of discrimination the state wished to
qualification does not “violate the constitutional right to create.
an impartial jury . . . because all individual jurors are to
Rehnquist added that if one were to follow Mcsome extent predisposed towards one result or an- Cree’s “illogical and hopelessly impractical” standard,
other.”289
that is “if it were true that the Constitution required a
Lower courts had sided with McCree, finding certain mix of individual viewpoints on the jury, then
that “social science evidence” showed “that ‘death qual- trial judges would be required to undertake the
ification’ produced juries that ‘were more prone to con- Sisyphean task of ‘balancing’ juries, making sure that
vict’ capital defendants than ‘non-death qualified’ each contains the proper number of Democrats and Rejuries.”290
publicans, young persons and old persons, white-collar
Rehnquist dismissed the studies because of what executives and blue-collar laborers, and so on.”298
Again, Rehnquist mixed the concepts of excluhe said were “several serious flaws in the evidence.”291
Quoting language used when the Court weighed the sion and random chance. It was not random chance that
same issue two decades earlier, Rehnquist labeled the created the panel McCree objected to; it was the practice
research “too tentative and fragmentary.”292
of death qualification. As there is no political party
Criminal Law Brief
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qualification, age qualification, or occupation qualification for jury service, none of these factors is remotely
congruent.
While Rehnquist dismissed the social science research presented in the case, in the dissent Marshall referred to it as “overwhelming evidence that
death-qualified juries are substantially more likely to
convict.”299 Rather than questioning varying research
practices, Marshall took confidence from “the essential
unanimity of the results obtained by researchers using
diverse subjects and varied methodologies”300
Marshall noted that the death qualification
process has a disparate effect on groups more likely to
hold anti-death penalty views, thus excluding more
women and African Americans from jury service.
Marshall suggested that capital defendants suffer
a double burden. First, unlike defendants for other
crimes, capital defendants are burdened with a jury
which has been systematically and legally structured to
increase the likelihood of conviction. Second,
I cannot help thinking that respondent
here would have stood a far better
chance of prevailing on his constitutional
claims had he not been challenging a
procedure peculiar to the administration
of the death penalty. For in no other context would a majority of this Court refuse
to find any constitutional violation in a
state practice that systematically operates to render juries more likely to convict, and to convict on the more serious
charges.301
Thus, the absurd possibility Marshall implied: it may be
easier to convict someone of capital murder than of a
lesser crime.
In Gray v. Mississippi (1987)302 the judge excluded a legally qualified juror for cause at the prosecution’s request. In effect, the judge excluded the juror to
compensate the prosecutor for previous decisions the
judge made to deny the prosecutor’s earlier challenges.
This case then hinged on whether the disqualification of a qualified juror was a sufficient error to require the case be overturned, or whether the decision
should be considered “harmless.”303
In a five to four decision written by Blackmun,
the Court employed a standard based on “whether the
composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly
have been affected by the trial court’s error” reasoning
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that “the nature of the selection process defies any attempt to establish that an erroneous Witherspoon exclusion is harmless.”304
In a group voir dire, jurors were asked questions
to establish whether they were death qualified. Apparently realizing that if they said they would not impose
the death penalty they would be excused, an otherwise
unprecedented number of prospective jurors announced
their opposition to the death penalty. The judge grew
suspicious that they were misleading him to dodge service on the jury, at one point saying, “Now I don’t want
nobody telling me that, just to get off the jury. Now,
that’s not being fair with me.”305 Because he doubted
their sincerity, the judge began to disallow traditional
challenges for cause when jurors said they were reluctant to impose the death penalty. Instead, the prosecutor
had to use many of his nine peremptory challenges to
remove jurors who claimed to be anti-death penalty.
After exhausting his peremptory challenges, the
prosecutor sought to exclude a prospective juror, Mrs.
Bounds, who initially expressed hesitation about the
death penalty before saying she was able to impose it.
The prosecutor asked for an extra peremptory to compensate for the challenges he had used on jurors the
judge refused to dismiss for cause.
Rejecting the notion of giving the prosecutor an
extra challenge, the judge instead suggested they see if
there was a way Mrs. Bounds might be excluded for
cause. The judge told the prosecutor: “Go ask her if
she’d vote guilty or not guilty…let’s see what she says
to that. If she gets to equivocating on that, I’m going to
let her off as a person who can’t make up her mind.”306
When Mrs. Bounds said she did not know
whether she would vote guilty or not (she had, after all,
not heard any evidence since the trial had not yet
begun), the judge ruled that she was “totally indecisive.
She says one thing one time and one thing another.”307
The judge dismissed her for cause.
Admitting that the prosecutor had, in effect, lost
some of his peremptory challenges to the judge’s decision-making, Blackmun nevertheless concluded, “we
cannot condone the ‘correction’ of one error by the commitment of another.”308
Meanwhile, Blackmun concluded that the improper exclusion of a qualified juror could not be tolerated: “some constitutional rights are so basic to a fair
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless
error. The right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge
or jury, is such a right.”309
Scalia’s dissent objected to nearly every premise
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of the majority opinion. Scalia believed the judge would
have been justified in granting the prosecution an extra
peremptory challenge, therefore Bounds would not have
been on the jury, therefore the defendant suffered no
harm when Bounds was removed for cause.
Scalia claimed that it is “certain that the jury that
was impaneled was identical to the jury that would have
been impaneled had the trial judge not erred”310 in refusing the prosecution’s earlier for cause challenges.
Later Scalia repeated his conclusion that it was “certain
that the trial judge’s decision to exclude Mrs. Bounds
for cause rather than granting that request [for an additional peremptory challenge] did not affect the composition of the jury in any way.”311 Scalia went on to say
the judge’s decision “could not possibly have affected
the composition of the jury”312 and that the resulting jury
was “identical”313 to the panel that otherwise would have
been created. Given there was no effect on the jury, and
therefore no effect on the defendant, “There is thus no
reason to vacate petitioner’s sentence.”314
Where the authority to grant the prosecution, and
only the prosecution, extra peremptory challenges
comes from, Scalia did not specify.315 Moreover, how
he could be “certain” that the resulting jury was “identical” is also hard to fathom since, presumably, a prosecutor armed with an extra peremptory challenge would
weigh the acceptability of every juror with a different
standard and would therefore adjust his strategy of using
the challenges. Both Blackmun in the majority opinion
and Powell in his concurring opinion note that the prosecutor may or may not have actually excluded Bounds
if he had an extra challenge, but it is inconceivable that
he would have engaged in precisely the same series of
challenges regardless of the number of challenges he
had at his disposal. Moreover, if the defense were to
also be granted an extra challenge in the interests of fairness the notion that an “identical” jury panel would
emerge becomes even more absurd.
The year after the Court decided Gray, it was
confronted by almost the opposite set of circumstances.
Rather than removing an eligible juror at the prosecution’s request, in Ross v. Oklahoma, the judge failed to
remove an ineligible juror at the defense’s request316
In a five to four decision, Rehnquist wrote for
the Court that the judge had indeed “erred” in failing to
“remove a juror whom the trial court should have excused for cause”317 because he stated he would support
the death penalty for the defendant regardless of the evidence or law. However, since the defense was able to
strike the juror (Mr. Huling) using a peremptory chalCriminal Law Brief

lenge, the error did not compromise petitioner’s “Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial
jury.”318 That is, “petitioner exercised a peremptory
challenge to remove him, and Huling was thereby removed from the jury as effectively as if the trial court
had excused him for cause.”319
The standard announced in Gray (the “relevant
inquiry is whether the composition of the jury penal as
a whole could possibly have been affected by the trial
court’s error”320) suggests that the verdict must be overturned since Ross’ jury was indisputably affected by
what amounted to the defense’s loss of a peremptory
challenge. “Although we agree that the failure to remove
Huling may have resulted in a jury panel different from
that which would otherwise have decided the case,”
Rehnquist failed to see a reason to apply the Court’s
finding in Gray because it was “too sweeping to be applied literally.”321
The defense’s loss of a peremptory challenge is
not a “constitutional problem” because “we reject the
notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury” as “peremptory challenges are not of
constitutional dimension.”322
Oklahoma state law specifies that defendants
must use preemptory challenges to exclude jurors whom
the judge has erroneously allowed to sit. “As required
by Oklahoma law, petitioner exercised one of his
peremptory challenges to rectify the trial court’s error,
and consequently he retained only eight peremptory
challenges to use in his unfettered discretion. But he received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore
his due process challenge fails.”323
To Rehnquist, “There is nothing arbitrary or irrational” about such a policy as it serves “the goal of
empanelling an impartial jury.”324 This statement is
made without limitation. Thus if the judge refused to
exclude nine ineligible pro-death penalty jurors, while
simultaneously granting prosecution challenges to antideath penalty jurors, effectively preserving all peremptories for the prosecution while eliminating them for the
defense, there would be “nothing arbitrary or irrational”
about such an outcome.
Indeed, Rehnquist noted that loss of all peremptories to correct for a judge’s error would be acceptable
because “the error is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.”325
Limitations on the use of peremptory challenges
are portrayed as not only reasonable but obvious. “The
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concept of a peremptory challenge as a totally free- tomatically impose death, for how else would the dewheeling right unconstrained by any procedural require- fense know of a juror’s position, and how else could the
ment is difficult to imagine.”326
defense act upon the rights Rehnquist discussed in Ross.
Instead, while six members of the Court found
Interestingly, Huling’s bias was so clear that
“had Huling sat on the jury that ultimately sentenced pe- the refusal to inquire about automatic imposition of the
titioner to death…the sentence would have to be over- death penalty to be a due process violation, Rehnquist,
turned.”327 However, Rehnquist questioned the notion Scalia, and Thomas dissented.
In an opinion written by White, the Court noted
that the panel that ultimately formed was less than impartial because “none of those 12 jurors…was [sic] chal- that “a juror who will automatically vote for the death
lenged for cause by petitioner.”328 Under Rehnquist’s penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider
logic, then, when the challenge of a blatantly biased the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumjuror is rebuffed, the defense should have responded by stances as the instructions require him to do.”334 The
challenging jurors whose responses were less egre- state was empowered to remove anti-death penalty persons from the jury with the right to ask about opposition
giously biased.
Justice Marshall issued an angry dissent stating, to capital punishment, but how could a defendant “ex“[a] man’s life is at stake. We should not be playing ercise intelligently his complementary challenge for
games.”329 The logic of forcing the defense to use one cause against those biased persons on the venire who as
of its peremptory challenges to
jurors would unwaveringly imcorrect a judge’s error was lost
death” if he could not ask
Marshall could not com- pose
on Marshall, who noted that,
questions to identify pro-death
“everyone concedes that the trial
prehend how the Court penalty excludables.335 Without
opportunity to ask a relevant
judge could not arbitrarily take
could fail to apply the
question of prospective jurors,
away one of the defendant’s
peremptory challenges. Yet, that
Gray precedent because the right to challenge for cause
becomes a “meaningless”
is in effect exactly what hap“here
the
trial
court,
330
right.336
pened here.”
Marshall could not comIn contrast to the proserather than excusing a
prehend how the Court could
cution’s direct question, the defail to apply the Gray precedent qualified juror, refused to fense was left to work with only
because “here the trial court, excuse a biased juror. . . .” a general question about whether
rather than excusing a qualified
prospective jurors thought they
juror, refused to excuse a biased
could be fair.
juror” but “the loss of a peremptory challenge in this
Scalia’s dissent, joined by Rehnquist and
case affected the composition of the jury panel in pre- Thomas, directly contradicted the language of the Ross
cisely the same way as the trial court’s error in Gray it- decision authored by Rehnquist and signed by Scalia a
year earlier. Gone is their conclusion that a single juror
self.”331
In Morgan v. Illinois, the prosecution requested who would automatically vote to impose death would
that the judge ask all prospective jurors if they would mean “the sentence would have to be overturned.”337 It
automatically vote against imposing the death is replaced with a sneering renouncement of the Court’s
penalty.332 The judge agreed. The defense then re- position in Ross, which is to say, a sneering renouncequested that the judge ask all prospective jurors if they ment of their own position in Ross. Scalia wrote: “The
would automatically vote for imposing the death penalty Court today holds that a juror who will always impose
and the judge declined.
the death penalty for capital murder is not ‘imparRecall in Ross that Rehnquist’s opinion, joined tial.’”338 He added, “The Court has, in effect, now added
by Scalia, asserted that, had someone who would auto- the new rule that no merciless jurors can sit.”339
Scalia stated that: “The fact that a particular
matically vote for a death sentence “sat on the jury that
ultimately sentenced petitioner to death…the sentence juror thinks the death penalty proper whenever capital
would have to be overturned.”333 Such a position seem- murder is established does not disqualify him” because
ingly would lock Rehnquist and Scalia into supporting there is no “requirement that all jurors must, on the facts
a death qualification question on the inclination to au- of the case, be amenable to entertaining” a sentence less
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state law in the case. Illinois law explicitly states “the
jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors”
– and “if the jury determines unanimously that there are
no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court shall sentence the
defendant to death.” Quite distinct from Scalia’s semantic jumble, Morgan had a right to have mitigating factors
considered and any juror who would automatically impose a death sentence was without question a “lawless
juror.”
White responded directly to Scalia’s position:
“Justice Scalia, in dissent, insists that Illinois is entitled
to try a death penalty case with one or even twelve jurors
who, upon inquiry, announce that they would automatically vote to impose the death penalty if the defendant
is found guilty of a capital offense, no matter what the
so-called mitigating factors, whether statutory or nonstatutory, might be. But such jurors obviously deem
mitigating evidence to be irrelevant to their decision to
impose the death penalty…”346 and are therefore “announcing an intention not to follow the instructions.”347
The essence of the conservatives’ holding on
death qualification is this: it is acceptable when a judge
strikes a juror for cause when that juror suggests the
slightest hesitation to impose the death penalty. It is acceptable when a judge fails to strike for cause a juror
Mitigating factors may include but need
who says the death penalty should be automatically imnot be limited to the following: (1) the
posed. It is acceptable when a judge goes to great
defendant has no significant history of
lengths questioning a juror seeking a pretense to strike
prior criminal activity; (2) the murder
her on the prosecution’s behalf. It is acceptable when a
was committed while the defendant was
judge refuses a defense request to ask even the most
under the influence of extreme mental or
basic and fundamental question regarding whether a
emotional disturbance, although not such
juror intends to follow the law. It is acceptable that
as to constitute a defense to prosecution;
death qualification advances the participation of convic(3) the murdered individual was a partiction prone jurors. It is, in Rehnquist’s words, a defense
ipant in the defendant’s homicidal conof the state’s right to an impartial trial. As a Constituduct or consented to the homicidal act;
tional matter the state holds no such right. Nevertheless,
(4) the defendant acted under the comthe conservatives’ creativity in advancing a state’s right
pulsion of threat or menace of the immito impartial trials is clearly magnified by their wobbly
nent infliction of death or great bodily
definition of impartial.
harm; (5) the defendant was not personTrait Exclusion
ally present during commission of the act
While the Court has weighed the right to exclude
or acts causing death.344
jurors based on their beliefs, so too has it been faced
with the even more thorny (although sometimes concurNevertheless, Scalia drew a distinction between rent) effort to exclude jurors based on race.
jurors who would never impose the death penalty and
Race, it would seem apparent, infects the capital
those who would always impose the death penalty. The prosecution process. For example, one study found that
former “juror is a lawless juror,” the latter “juror to be an African American defendant accused of killing a
disqualified under the Court’s new rule is not.”345
white person was eleven times more likely to be senScalia’s point again neatly ignores the applicable tenced to death than a white defendant accused of killing

than death.340
Scalia coined a new phrase when he concluded
“the Court’s exclusion of these death- inclined jurors”
is not “justified.”341
A juror who would automatically impose the
death penalty is admitting they would automatically dismiss any and all mitigating evidence. Scalia sees no
problem with that because “we have held, not that he
must consider mitigating evidence, but only that he may
not, on legal grounds, refuse to consider it.”342 Thus,
Scalia distinguishes between the right to have evidence
considered and the right to not have evidence not considered (which heretofore have been amounted to the
same thing). That is similar to the concept that, for example, the right of criminal defendants to counsel is effectively the same as the right not to be forced to not
have counsel.
Scalia proceeded to argue that since Illinois had
absolutely no standard to define mitigation, it is perfectly reasonable for jurors to impose a personal standard which effectively recognized no forms of
mitigation343.
Scalia’s position that mitigation goes undefined
is somewhat harder to defend upon consulting the relevant Illinois statute, which states:
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an African American.348 Another study indicated that
the racial imbalance reflects both an increased likelihood that capital charges will be filed against the former
and an increased likelihood that once capital charges are
filed a death sentence will be returned.349 Yet another
calculated that less than two-tenths of one percent of the
executions in this country have been in response to a
white person killing an African American.350
One factor in these patterns is surely the response of the jury. Researchers have found notable differences in response to the race of the defendant and the
race of the victim.351
The Court, sensitive to both the reality and appearance of bias, has at times thundered against the exclusion of jurors. In Strauder v. West Virginia (1880),
the Court confronted a state law barring African Americans from jury service. The Court struck the law down
because: “The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights
it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his
neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same
legal status in society as that which he holds.”352 Jurors
must be “indifferently chosen” with regard to race to secure a defendant’s right to “protection of life and liberty.”353 The Court suggested that in this area the
judiciary should be held not only to a legal standard but
a societal standard because discrimination inside a
courthouse is “a stimulant to that race prejudice which
is an impediment to securing …equal justice.”354
Notable then are the efforts of Rehnquist and his
conservative colleagues a century later to defend exclusion and differential treatment based on race. While the
series of cases are not exclusively capital prosecutions,
they illustrate the foundation of their thinking as it applies to trait exclusion of jurors in capital proceedings,
and they represent the foundation of their conclusions
in the multiple hearings of the Miller-El death penalty
appeal.
In Batson v. Kentucky (1986),355 and subsequent
juror exclusion cases, the means of achieving exclusion
was the peremptory challenge. Batson, an African
American on trial for burglary, objected to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove all of the
prospective African American jurors from serving on his
jury. Batson claimed a violation of the fair cross section
requirement and the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment.
In a seven to two decision, the Court agreed.
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell concluded that “the
defendant does have the right to be tried by a jury whose
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members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria.”356 Further, “the Equal Protection Clause forbids
the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race.”357 To operationalize this right, the
Court ruled that if a prosecutor engages in an apparent
pattern of racial exclusion the burden will be placed on
the prosecutor to demonstrate that there was some nonrace based rationale that guided the decision on whom
to challenge.358
Rehnquist again dissented from a holding that
would protect equal access to juries. In the process,
Rehnquist offered a strong defense of the peremptory
challenge. “I cannot subscribe to the Court’s unprecedented use of the Equal Protection Clause to restrict the
historic scope of the peremptory challenge, which has
been described as ‘a necessary part of trial by jury.’ In
my view, there is simply nothing ‘unequal’ about the
State’s using its peremptory challenges to strike blacks
from the jury...”359 Thus, in addition to accommodating
the “historic” nature of peremptory challenges, Rehnquist accommodates the “historic” nature of racism.
Indeed, he characterized race-based thinking as
“extremely useful.”360
“The use of group affiliations, such as age, race,
or occupation, as a ‘proxy’ for potential juror partiality…has long been accepted as a legitimate basis for the
State’s exercise of peremptory challenges….Given the
need for reasonable limitations on the time devoted to
voir dire, the use of such ‘proxies’ by both the State and
the defendant may be extremely useful in eliminating
from the jury persons who might be biased in one way
or another.”361
Four years after Batson, Daniel Holland objected
to peremptory challenges used by the prosecution to create an all-white jury in his kidnapping trial (Holland v.
Illinois 1990362). Unlike Batson, however, Holland was
white. Holland objected to the exclusion of African
Americans on Sixth Amendment fair cross section
grounds.
In a five to four decision, written by Scalia and
joined by Rehnquist, the Court offered an even more
forceful defense of peremptory challenges. An impartial
jury “compels peremptory challenges.”363 Scalia concluded that under the Sixth Amendment we are guaranteed “not a representative jury…but an impartial one”364
and an impartial jury “would positively be obstructed”365
by a petit jury fair cross section requirement, because
one would have to “cripple”366 the peremptory challenge
which “would undermine rather than further the Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by ‘an impartial
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jury.’”367
“The rule we announce today is not only the
only plausible reading of the text of the Sixth Amendment, but we think it best furthers the Amendment’s central purpose as well. Although the constitutional
guarantee runs only to the individual and not to the
State, the goal it expresses is jury impartiality with respect to both contestants.”368 Just as Rehnquist did in
Adams369, Scalia here re-writes the Sixth Amendment to
protect heretofore unmentioned (in the Constitution)
rights of the State.
While ruling against Holland’s fair cross section
claim, Scalia admitted that, an Equal Protection case
against race based juror exclusion would have merit:

By refusing to apply the fair cross section requirement, Marshall argued the Court empowered
“prosecutor’s systematic use of peremptory challenges
to exclude Afro-American prospective jurors on the
ground that they, as a class, lack the intelligence or impartiality fairly to fill the juror’s role”374
The next year Powers v. Ohio375 brought much
the same facts to the Court as did Holland. Larry Joe
Powers was a white defendant who objected to the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to eliminate
African Americans from his jury. Unlike Holland, Powers advanced an Equal Protection argument rather than
a fair cross section argument.
The Court, in a seven to two decision, agreed
“The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor
We do not hold that the systematic exfrom using the State’s peremptory challenges to exclude
clusion of blacks from the jury system
otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from the petit
through peremptory chaljury solely by reason of their
lenges is lawful; it obviously
race.”376
The Court ruled that
Kennedy, writing for the
is not. We do not even hold
that the exclusion of blacks
not only the plaintiff Court, quoted Scalia’s opinion in
through peremptory chalHolland stating, “as the Holland
Court made explicit, however,
lenges in this particular trial but also the prospecracial exclusion of prospective juwas lawful. Nor do we even
tive jurors themrors violates the overriding comhold that this particular
mand of the Equal Protection
(white) defendant does not selves have a right to
Clause, and ‘race-based exclusion
have a valid constitutional
a selection process
is no more permissible at the indichallenge to such racial exnot
based
on
race.
vidual petit jury stage than at the
clusion. All we hold is that
venire stage.’”377 The Court ruled
he does not have a valid conthat not only the plaintiff but also
stitutional challenge based on
370
the prospective jurors themselves have a right to a sethe Sixth Amendment.
lection process not based on race.378 Scalia, joined by
In fact, Scalia argues that while the Sixth Amendment Rehnquist, vigorously dissented from the decision
establishes only the need for a representative jury pool founded on Scalia’s own words.
not a representative jury, and was therefore satisfied in
Where Scalia asserted in Holland that the Sixth
Holland’s case, the Fourteenth Amendment by contrast Amendment did not apply to racial exclusion, but Equal
applies to both the pool and the resulting jury: “[t]he Protection did, a year later he realized, “What is true
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of unequal treat- with respect to the Sixth Amendment is true with respect
ment in general and racial discrimination in particular to the Equal Protection Clause as well.”379 In other
…has equal application at the petit jury and the venire words, neither applied to Powers’ claim.
Scalia fumed that nothing in the Court’s decision
stages, as our cases have long recognized.”371
In his dissent, Marshall objected to the Court’s in Strauder380 compelled the protection of a white dedistinction between the goals of an impartial jury and a fendant from a jury process which excluded African
fair cross section jury, arguing that the latter goal does Americans. “It was not suggested in Strauder, and I am
not serve the former is “a false dichotomy.”372 Also, sure it was quite unthinkable, that a white defendant
writing in his dissent, Stevens echoed the sentiment: “A could have had his conviction reversed on the basis of”
jury that is the product of such a racially discriminatory a process which “did not exclude members of his
selection process cannot possibly be an ‘impartial jury’ race.”381 Scalia did not emphasize that the case in which
“it was quite unthinkable” was decided more than 100
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.”373
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years earlier, in a time of rampant legal segregation.
Moreover, if Strauder was the controlling precedent in
Powers, surely it was the controlling precedent a year
earlier in Holland when Scalia wrote for the Court: “We
do not hold that the systematic exclusion of blacks from
the jury system through peremptory challenges is lawful; it obviously is not.”382
In a new formulation, however, Scalia realized
that the systematic exclusion of African Americans from
jury service by prosecutors’ use of peremptory challenges is actually an indication of equality. “When that
group, like all others, has been made subject to peremptory challenge on the basis of its group characteristic,
its members have been treated not differently, but the
same. In fact, it would constitute discrimination to exempt them from the peremptory strike exposure to
which all others are subject. If, for example, men were
permitted to be struck but not women, or fundamentalists but not atheists, or blacks but not whites, members
of the former groups would plainly be the object of discrimination.”383
That logic would support innumerable legal conclusions – it would be perfectly reasonable to ban
African Americans from part of a bus, say the front, if
you banned whites from part of the bus, say the back,
because in that case everyone would be barred from part
of the bus.
Indeed, the majority casts Scalia’s position in
just such a light. “The suggestion that racial classifications may survive when visited upon all persons is no
more authoritative today than the case which advanced
the theorem, Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). This idea has
no place in our modern equal protection jurisprudence.
It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become
legitimate on the assumption that all persons suffer them
in equal degree.”384
As Rehnquist argued in his Batson dissent,
Scalia reminds us that race based use of peremptory
challenges is inherently rational. “A peremptory strike
on the basis of group membership implies nothing more
than the undeniable reality (upon which the peremptory
strike system is largely based) that all groups tend to
have particular sympathies and hostilities.”385
Scalia also reminded us that the thrust of the
Court’s thinking endangers peremptory challenges. “To
affirm that the Equal Protection Clause applies to strikes
of individual jurors is effectively to abolish the peremptory challenge.”386 Instead, peremptory challenges need
protection because they ensure that “the jury will be the
fairest possible.”387 The notion that peremptory chal94

lenges could have unconstitutional consequences “is implausible” because they are “such a permanent and universal feature of our jury-trial system.”388
But that logic implies that it is impossible to use
a legal tactic for nefarious purposes. That is the very
essence of this case; not that peremptory challenges are
unconstitutional, but that using them for racial purposes
would be. Similarly, the state’s powers to arrest and
prosecute are “permanent and universal” features, but
nothing in their ubiquity prevents them from being marshaled for discriminatory purposes and ultimately being
subject to limitation.
Finally, Scalia noted that protecting the individual juror, rather than the defendant, from exclusion is
also specious. “We have never held, or even said, that
a juror has an equal protection right not to be excluded
from a particular case through peremptory challenge.”389
Scalia neatly overlooked a federal law. Section 243 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which was enacted as a
way to give meaning to the recently enacted Fourteenth
Amendment, provides:
No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by
law shall be disqualified for service as
grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or of any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.
Thus, to the extent that Justice Scalia intends to say that
there is no constitutional-level guarantee that jurors are
not excluded for inappropriate reasons, he is, at least,
misleading. In addition, to the extent that he means that
there is no support in the Constitution or federal law that
jurors have an explicit right not to be excluded for the
wrong reasons, he is wrong.
In Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003)390, the prosecution in Dallas County, Texas used 10 peremptory challenges to remove African Americans from the capital
jury.
In an eight to one decision, the Court found
“substantial evidence” of racial bias in jury selection, in
violation of principles held in Batson, and therefore restored Miller-El’s ability to appeal his sentence.391
The prosecution in the case not only used
peremptories against African Americans, but treated
African Americans disparately throughout the voir dire
process. While whites were typically asked for their
thoughts on the death penalty without preface, African
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Americans were first told what the death penalty means
and then asked the question.392 While whites were typically told what the minimum sentence would be if the
defendant was convicted and then asked if they could
impose it, African Americans were not told what the
minimum sentence was and were asked only what it
should be. Thus, “prosecutors designed their questions
to elicit responses that would justify the removal of
African-Americans from the venire.”393
The defense unearthed evidence that discrimination against jurors was a standing practice in the prosecutor’s office. A sitting judge testified that when he
worked in the prosecutor’s office, superiors had told him
not to allow African Americans on juries. A Dallas
County district attorney memo from the 1960s – known
to at least one of the prosecutors in the present case –
instructed prosecutors to exercise peremptory challenges
against minorities: “Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos,
Mexicans or a member of any minority race on a jury,
no matter how rich or how well educated.”394
Taking up the mantle of defending exclusion in
this case was Justice Thomas. In his dissent, Thomas
called the defense’s allegations “entirely circumstantial.”395
Why did the prosecutor ask whites and African
Americans different questions? According to Thomas:
“The strategy pursued by the prosecution makes perfect
sense: When it was necessary to draw out a venireman’s
feelings about the death penalty they would use the
graphic script, but when it was overkill they would
not.”396
The slight logical flaw in that position is that the
description of execution preceded the question on the
death penalty – thus the “strategy” that “makes perfect
sense” would have also required the prosecutor to see
into the future. Thomas concedes the point: “I recognize that these voir dire statements only indirectly support respondent’s explanation because the graphic script
was typically given at the outset of voir dire—before the
above quoted veniremen had the chance to give their
stark answers.”397
Even so, after conducting his own analysis in
which he compared the treatment of individual white
and African American prospective jurors, Thomas disputed that race was related to the type of questions that
the prosecutor asked. After all, in Thomas’ calculation:
“race predicted use of the graphic script only 74% of the
time.”398
After the Court affirmed Miller-El’s right to proceed with his appeal, lower courts rejected his conCriminal Law Brief

tention that the construction of his jury was with a racial
blueprint. Miller-El’s appeal of that conclusion would
itself be aired before the Court in 2005 in Miller-El v.
Dretke.
In a six to three decision, the Court found “clear
and convincing” evidence of racial bias indicated by the
overall pattern in jury selection (“By the time a jury was
chosen, the State had peremptorily challenged twelve
percent of qualified nonblack panel members, but eliminated 91% of the black ones. It blinks reality to deny
that the State struck [jurors] because they were black.”),
the disparate questioning of white and African Americans during voir dire, and the irreconcilable use of explanations to justify the removal of African Americans
while similarly situated whites were accepted. (“Nonblack jurors whose remarks on rehabilitation could well
have signaled a limit on their willingness to impose a
death sentence were not questioned further and drew no
objection, but the prosecution expressed apprehension
about a black juror’s belief in the possibility of reformation even though he repeatedly stated his approval of
the death penalty and testified that he could impose it
according to state legal standards…”).399
To the majority, “the very integrity of the courts
is jeopardized” when prosecutors respond to potential
jurors based on “illegitimate grounds like race.”400
In a dissent joined by Rehnquist and Scalia,
Thomas again took exception to Miller-El’s claim that
race was a factor in jury selection. Referring to the case
as “the antithesis of clear and convincing evidence,”
Thomas’s analysis found no hint of racialized thinking
or behavior.
Thomas rejected the majority’s contention that
whites and African Americans with similar voir dire responses were treated differently. “To isolate race as a
variable,” Thomas wrote, would require that “the jurors
must be comparable in all respects that the prosecutor
proffers as important.” In other words, a prosecutor
could never be found to violate the prohibition on using
race in jury selection because any difference the prosecutor identifies would justify disparate treatment.401
Indeed, Thomas noted “any number of characteristics other than race could have been apparent to
prosecutors from a visual inspection of the jury panel.”
What those factors would be, other than similarly proscribed gender, Thomas did not specify.
Even where prospective white and African
American jurors in Miller-El’s case were identical in
thinking, background, and all other respects, Thomas
warned that comparisons of their treatment still would
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not be meaningful. Whites, Thomas noted, “were questioned much later in the jury selection process, when the
State had fewer peremptories to spare” thus requiring a
different strategic response.
Thomas’ conclusion is somewhat ironic given
that his attention to comparisons of individual jurors in
the first Miller-El case was at the heart of his conclusion
that race was not a factor, and was central to the majority’s interest in conducting its own comparison of individual jurors in the second Miller-El case. Apparently,
then, Thomas has concluded that Whites and Africans
Americans were not similarly situated enough that differences in their treatment reveal anything about racial
disparities. At the same time, however, he has also concluded that Whites and African Americans were similarly situated enough that similarities in their treatment
reveal the absence of racial disparities.
Indeed, Thomas held up several examples of
whites who were treated similarly to African Americans.
Even more forcefully, Thomas pointed to prospective
white jurors who were more favorable to the death
penalty than several African Americans, but were nevertheless struck from the panel by the prosecution. For
example, Thomas scolded the majority for failing to explain why the prosecution struck “Penny Crowson, a
white panelist who expressed a firm belief in the death
penalty.”402 Thomas’ choice of Crowson as an exemplar
of his case suggests how little foundation existed for his
position. That is, although Thomas did not note it in his
dissent, Crowson has said in voir dire that she would.403
It is odd that Thomas used Crowson as an example of
the prosecution’s fairness. Indeed, one wonders how
Thomas concluded Crowson had a “firm belief in the
death penalty?”404 The answer: that precise phrase,
without explanation or justification, appeared twice in
the state’s brief for the case.405
Miller-El’s case demonstrates the depth of
Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist’s deference to the prosecution. Even under Thomas’ highly favorable accounting, race accounted for 74% of the state’s questioning
pattern in voir dire. But the prosecution said race did
not matter – so race did not matter. But this deference
has the effect of nullifying the rights of the defendant.
Overall the racial exclusion cases demonstrate
the conservatives’ tendency to redefine the issue – first
by questioning that exclusion is wrong, then by questioning that it happens, then by questioning that it matters. Even as Miller-El successfully appealed the
prosecution’s racial blueprint for his case, his experience
only serves to dramatize the absurdly high bar one must
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clear to demonstrate discrimination in jury selection.
Miller-El had not only stark numbers on his side but a
clear and unmistakable pattern of differential treatment
infecting all phases of the jury selection process and a
documented history of racist jury selection. In Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas’s view, the resulting right, in
effect, is not to a jury of one’s peers, but to a jury selected by anything short of boastfully racist procedures.
ConClusion
Jury service “is not a pleasant experience in many jurisdictions” as it “tends
to be time consuming and often seemingly useless from the point of view of
the prospective juror” – Justice Rehnquist 406
With the participation of the Court’s most conservative members, the right to a jury determination of
a capital defendant’s fate has expanded. The era of
judges making factual determinations then determining
whether to apply a death sentence (for example in Arizona) or judges having the power to overrule a jury’s
life sentence to impose death (for example in Florida)
are over.
The expanded right to access a jury and have it
hold determinative power over a defendant’s life has
not, however, been accompanied by commensurate attention to the instructions that guide those jurors through
the applicable law toward their verdict. Nor have adequate procedures been designed to produce a truly representative jury panel.
In brief, the right to a jury has been enhanced
without concern for the government’s obligations necessary to animate that right. This contradiction has clear
consequences. A capital defendant puts his life in the
hands of a group we have strong reason to suspect will
have difficulty understanding their instructions, difficulty defining and applying mitigating evidence, and uncertainty regarding the true meaning of the sentences
available to them. Moreover, that group was assembled
systematically to be unrepresentative of community
mores.
In the cases highlighted here, dealing with mitigation instructions, the definition of sentences, belief
exclusion, and trait exclusion, Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas have led the Court toward a laissez faire position on the jury system. They assert there is no problem.
Winter 2009

They offer unfalsifiable and infallible evidence that the
jury functioned properly. If a problem arises, they assert
it has no consequence. If it has a consequence, they assert it was permissible because the problem could have
happened by chance, or was inevitable, or affected only
some jurors, or served their newly discovered state’s
right to an impartial trial.
Even as they strongly advance their arguments,
their standards for defining an acceptable jury system
are slippery. This is perhaps best embodied by a comparison of the logic raised in response to the use of
peremptory challenges. When the state used peremptory
challenges to eliminate African Americans from the jury,
Scalia declared the right to unfettered use of peremptory
challenges must never be thwarted because the Constitution’s guarantee of an impartial jury “compels peremptory challenges.”407 Scalia added that peremptory
challenges are a “permanent and universal feature of our
jury-trial system”408 which serves to ensure “the jury
will be the fairest possible.”409 Similarly, Rehnquist
noted “the historic scope of the peremptory challenge,
which has been described as ‘a necessary part of trial by
jury.’”410
When a defendant lost a peremptory challenge
to a judge’s failure to remove what Rehnquist called “an
incompetent juror” the historic, permanent and universal, compelled nature of peremptory challenges took on
a different hue.411 The defense’s loss of a peremptory
was in Rehnquist’s words (joined by Scalia): not a “constitutional problem” because “we reject the notion that
the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation
of the constitutional right to an impartial jury” as
“peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension.”412
Whether in response to peremptory challenges,
or the many other issues raised here, the conservatives
on the Court come perilously close to defining a “fair
jury” as falling within the parameters of whatever happened to occur in a particular case. Thus, under Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas’ views, the capital
defendant’s right to access a jury expands while his
right to access an impartial jury contracts.
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